The Rule of Reason by Hovenkamp, Herbert J.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2018 
The Rule of Reason 
Herbert J. Hovenkamp 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics 
Commons, Courts Commons, Economic History Commons, Industrial Organization Commons, Intellectual 
Property Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal History 
Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Litigation Commons, Public Economics Commons, and the Social 
Welfare Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Hovenkamp, Herbert J., "The Rule of Reason" (2018). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1778. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1778 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
81
THE RULE OF REASON
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Abstract
Antitrust’s rule of reason was born out of a thirty-year Supreme Court 
debate concerning the legality of multi-firm restraints on competition. By 
the late 1920s the basic contours of the rule for restraints among 
competitors was roughly established. Antitrust policy toward vertical 
restraints remained much more unstable, however, largely because their 
effects were so poorly understood.
This Article provides a litigation field guide for antitrust claims under 
the rule of reason—or more precisely, for situations when application of 
the rule of reason is likely. At the time pleadings are drafted and even up 
to the point of summary judgment, the parties are often uncertain whether 
a court will apply the rule of reason. Part I examines pleading and 
summary judgment rules, including the role of stare decisis, arguing that 
stare decisis should apply to a mode of analysis rather than to a specific 
class of restraints. Then, Part II discusses numerous problems 
surrounding the burden of proof and the quality of evidence needed to 
shift the burden or get to a jury. It also shows why a consumer welfare 
standard for antitrust violations is the only manageable one for evaluating 
practices under the rule of reason. The alternative, general welfare 
standard requires that all consumer losses be quantified and compared 
with producer efficiency gains, as well as likely effects on others. Aside 
from any substantive reasons for preferring a consumer welfare standard, 
a general welfare standard is impossible to apply in any but the most 
obvious cases.
Additionally, this Article considers how to identify the types of 
conduct to which antitrust’s rule of reason should be applied, as well as 
the range of appropriate remedies, particularly when the basic features of 
joint activity are either unchallenged or conceded to be competitive, but 
a specific provision or practice threatens competition. It then turns to the 
special case of antitrust restraints in markets for intellectual property 
rights. The final Part examines the market structure requirements for 
antitrust rule of reason cases.
                                                                                                                     
* James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and Wharton School of Business, 
University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Scott Hemphill, Erik N. Hovenkamp, Christopher R. 
Leslie, Barak Orbach, & D. Daniel Sokol for valuable comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts evaluate most antitrust claims under a “rule of reason,” which 
requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that defendants with market 
power have engaged in anticompetitive conduct. To conclude that a 
practice is “reasonable” means that it survives antitrust scrutiny.1 This is 
in contrast to antitrust’s “per se” rule, in which power generally need not 
be proven and anticompetitive effects are largely inferred from the 
conduct itself.2 However, the domain of the per se rule has been 
narrowing.3 Today it extends to “naked”4 price fixing and market division 
agreements, a small subset of boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal, 
and—by a very thin thread—some tying arrangements.5
This Article provides a litigation field guide for antitrust claims under 
the rule of reason—or more precisely, for situations when application of 
the rule of reason is likely. At the time pleadings are drafted, and even up 
to the point of summary judgment, the parties are often uncertain whether 
a court will apply the rule of reason. Because the choice of rule presents 
a question of law, it is generally established prior to trial.6 Part I examines 
pleading and summary judgment rules, including the role of stare decisis, 
arguing that stare decisis should apply to a mode of analysis rather than 
to a specific class of restraints.7 Then, Part II discusses numerous 
                                                                                                                     
1. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1501 (4th ed. 2017).
2. See, e.g., Newman v. Universal Pictures, 813 F.2d 1519, 1522–23 (9th Cir. 1987)
(explaining that the per se rule “relieves plaintiff of the burden of demonstrating an 
anticompetitive effect, which is assumed”).
3. See discussion infra notes 283–304.
4. On the meaning of “naked,” see infra text accompanying notes 338–39.
5. European Union Competition Law makes a roughly similar distinction between 
restraints that are evaluated “by object,” which is roughly similar to the per se rule; and restraints 
that are evaluated “by effect,” which is roughly similar to the rule of reason. See EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT: GUIDANCE ON RESTRICTIONS OF 
COMPETITION “BY OBJECT” FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFINING WHICH AGREEMENTS MAY BENEFIT 
FROM THE DE MINIMIS NOTICE 3 (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/
de_minimis_notice_annex.pdf.
6. See discussion infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
7. See discussion infra Part I.
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problems surrounding the burden of proof and the quality of evidence 
needed to shift the burden. This Part argues that the plaintiff’s burden for 
a prima facie case should be relatively stringent for the market power 
requirement, but relatively light for proof of an anticompetitive act.8 It
also shows why a consumer welfare standard for antitrust violations is 
the only manageable one for evaluating practices under the rule of reason. 
By contrast, the general welfare standard requires that all consumer losses 
be quantified and compared with producer efficiency gains, as well as 
likely effects on others. Aside from any substantive reasons for preferring 
a consumer welfare standard, a general welfare standard is impossible to 
apply in any but the most obvious cases. The consumer welfare standard 
queries only whether output will be higher or lower (or prices lower or 
higher) under the restraint. This query can be difficult enough, but is 
nevertheless much simpler than the proof requirements for a general 
welfare standard.9 Finally, this Part examines the possibility of truncated, 
or “quick look,” analysis as an alternative to both the rule of reason and 
the per se rule, arguing against recognition of any categorical “quick
look.”10 It concludes with a brief discussion of “balancing,” and why the 
rule of reason’s staged set of queries is legitimately designed so that 
courts can avoid balancing whenever possible.11
Part III turns to identification of the types of conduct to which 
antitrust’s rule of reason applies.12 It also examines the question of 
appropriate remedies, particularly when the basic features of joint activity 
are unchallenged or conceded to be competitive but a specific provision 
or practice threatens competition. Then, it turns briefly to the special case 
of antitrust restraints in markets for intellectual property rights.13 The
final Part examines the market structure requirements for antitrust rule of 
reason cases, including the assessment of power and application of the 
rule of reason to vertical agreements,14 as well as to agreements that have 
both horizontal and vertical elements.15
                                                                                                                     
8. See discussion infra Section II.B.
9. See discussion infra Section II.D.
10. See discussion infra Section II.E.
11. See discussion infra Section II.F.
12. See discussion infra Sections III.A–B.
13. See discussion infra Section III.E.
14. See discussion infra Sections IV.A–C.
15. See discussion infra Section IV.D.
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*  *  *
The rule of reason was born in the 1911 Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States16 case. Writing for the Court, Supreme Court Chief Justice Edward 
Douglass White reached the pedantic and rather silly conclusion that one 
cannot decide antitrust cases except by using “reason.”17 As a result, it 
followed that a rule of reason should be applied.18 Actually, as an 
Associate Justice fifteen years earlier, Justice White spoke more sensibly 
in the United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association19 railroad 
price fixing case,20 where he dissented from Supreme Court Justice Rufus 
Peckham’s opinion for the Court holding that the Sherman Act 
automatically condemned all horizontal restraints.21 In Trans-Missouri,
Justice White protested that the Act could not conceivably condemn 
every restraint on freedom of trade, “whether reasonable or 
unreasonable.”22 Rather, “the words ‘restraint of trade’ embrace only 
contracts which unreasonably restrain trade, and, therefore, that 
reasonable contracts, although they, in some measure, ‘restrain trade,’ are 
not within the meaning of the words.”23 Justice White clearly had the 
better of this disagreement with Justice Peckham. Even a simple buy–sell 
agreement for 100 bricks “restrains trade” to the extent that it removes 
those bricks from the market. Literally, condemnation of “every” restraint 
would outlaw ordinary business agreements.
The combination of the Trans-Missouri and Standard Oil decisions 
produced considerable confusion for some time. The Trans-Missouri
majority seemed to say that the Sherman Act reached every restraint on 
                                                                                                                     
16. 221 U.S. 502 (1911).
17. Id. at 516.
18. See id. at 517 (“As the cases cannot, by any possible conception, be treated as 
authoritative without the certitude that reason was resorted to for the purpose of deciding them, it 
follows as a matter of course that it must have been held by the light of reason, since the conclusion 
could not have been otherwise reached, that the assailed contracts or agreements were within the 
general enumeration of the statute, and that their operation and effect brought about the restraint 
of trade which the statute prohibited.”).
19. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
20. Edward Douglass White had served as an Associate Justice from 1894 until 1910; on 
Dec. 19, 1910, he became Chief Justice. See White, Edward Douglass, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY 
OF U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000366 (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2017).
21. See Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 343–74 (White, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 346.
23. Id. But see id. at 328 (“[T]he plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited 
to that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are 
included in such language, and no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act 
that which has been omitted by congress.”).
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competition, whether reasonable or not. However, Standard Oil made it 
seem that all restraints should be governed by the rule of reason. In 1927, 
the Supreme Court cleared up some of the confusion in United States v.
Trenton Potteries, Co.,24 where Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone explained that although restraints generally are subjected to a rule 
of reason, specific types of restraints such as “agreements to fix [and] 
maintain prices” are automatically deemed unreasonable.25
For horizontal restraints, which are agreements among competitors or 
potential competitors, the classification system suggested by Trenton 
Potteries roughly resembles the one that we use today. By contrast, the 
law of vertical practices has been much less stable, mainly because of 
controversy about their purpose and effect.26 In 1911, the Supreme Court
held that resale price maintenance—supplier setting of a dealer’s resale 
prices—was unlawful per se.27 Dicta in its 1949 Standard Stations
decision, an exclusive dealing case, indicated that tying arrangements 
should also be treated very harshly.28 The Supreme Court followed this 
course in the 1950s, declaring certain ties unlawful per se but requiring 
proof of market power in the tying product.29 That requirement makes 
                                                                                                                     
24. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
25. Id. at 396; see also id. at 397–98 (“The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, 
if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. . . . Agreements which create such 
potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without 
the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed 
and without placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining 
from day to day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic 
conditions.”).
26. See discussion infra notes 460–515 and accompanying text. On the extreme hostility 
directed at vertical practices from the New Deal era through the 1960s, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 220–41 (2015).
27. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 399–400, 409 (1911). 
Although the Court did not use the term “per se,” it spoke of RPM contracts as a class, and made 
them automatically illegal without regard to power or anticompetitive effects. See id. 399–400. 
On the per se rule for RPM under Dr. Miles, see 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 1620.
28. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1947) (“Tying 
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”).
29. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (citation omitted) (“Among 
the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves 
are . . . tying arrangements.”); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608–
09 (1953) (explaining, in dicta, that tying is unlawful per se under Section 1 of Sherman Act 
whenever the seller has market power in the tying product and a substantial volume of tied product 
commerce is restrained). The Court hinted at this outcome in 1947, in International Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (“[I]t is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors 
from any substantial market.”), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 U.S. 
1281 (2006).
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ties unique among per se offenses. By contrast, exclusive dealing has 
always remained under at least a qualified rule of reason.30
I. THE RULE OF REASON AND THE COURTS
The antitrust statutes provide almost no guidance about the formation 
of specific antitrust rules of illegality. The Sherman Act31 says nothing 
useful on the subject. The Clayton Act32 proscribes price discrimination, 
tying and exclusive dealing, and mergers where the effect “may be 
substantially to lessen competition.”33 This language requires the court to 
assess the impact of the challenged restraint on competition, which 
suggests that per se treatment is not appropriate, but it does not say much 
else.34 In fact, the Act does not even define the term “competition” or 
provide any test for measuring whether it has been lessened.35
This spare language makes the court’s role unusually important in the 
development of antitrust rules. They are charged both with creating the 
substance of antitrust and with fashioning appropriate rules of pleading 
and procedure, including assignment of proof burdens.
A. Pleading Requirements
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,36 the Supreme Court very 
considerably tightened up the pleading requirements for antitrust cases.37
The plaintiff had alleged that the parallel failure of the regional telephone 
operating companies to enter one another’s geographic territories 
                                                                                                                     
30. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (holding 
exclusive dealing lawful in the absence of a significant market foreclosure). Parallel exclusive 
dealing practiced by most firms in the market might be evidence of anticompetitive exclusion, 
although it might also indicate that exclusive dealing is efficient under the circumstances. See
Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 97 (1982) (making this observation about the hearing aid 
market); C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1252 (2013).
31. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7
(2012)).
32. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 
14–19, 21, 22–27 (2012)).
33. Id. § 13(a). The effects language varies slightly among the following statutes, but not in 
any way that is relevant here. Id. § 13 (price discrimination); id. § 14 (tying and exclusive dealing);
id. § 18 (mergers).
34. On this point, see 1 RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW 87–88 (2014) (noting Clayton Act’s 
emphasis on provable effects).
35. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14–19, 21, 22–27.
36. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
37. Id. at 556–57.
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evidenced a conspiracy among them not to enter.38 The problem with that 
claim is that firms decline to enter one another’s markets all the time, and 
for reasons that have nothing to do with antitrust conspiracy. Pet stores 
do not sell bicycles and bicycle shops do not sell pets, but that fact alone 
hardly suggests that they have agreed to stay out of one another’s 
markets.39 Twombly turned the problem of a concededly inadequate 
pleading in a particular case into a globalized set of constraints that are 
widely viewed as requiring a form of fact pleading rather than simple 
notice pleading of a claim.40 In antitrust cases at least, the result has been 
prolix complaints often running to 100 pages or more,41 assuring 
plaintiffs that they have enough “factual matter” to resist dismissal.42
While parallel pricing suggests interdependence of behavior, parallel 
failure to move into new markets ordinarily does not.43 That is to say, 
Twombly could have been written much more narrowly as an antitrust
decision concerning the types of conduct that suggest conspiracy. Instead, 
the Court majority wrote a global attack on pleading requirements, 
reaching far beyond antitrust to all pleadings in the federal courts.
Post-Twombly decisions have consistently held that in antitrust cases 
pled under the rule of reason a plaintiff must adequately plead market 
power and the anticompetitive effects of the challenged restraints.44 A
successful complaint must not simply assert that the defendant has market 
power, or even that a particular grouping of sales is a relevant market. 
Rather, it must allege specific facts, such as lack of substitutability with 
                                                                                                                     
38. Id. at 550–51. The regional operating companies had been created by the antitrust 
consent decree in United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 142 n.41, 160 
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom, Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The decree 
divided the telephone system into regional monopolies. Id. at 141–42, 170. Later, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2012), removed their monopoly status, 
permitting the firms to do business in one another’s territories. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549; see 
also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371–73 (1999) (explaining significance of 
removal of monopoly status).
39. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond, 95 
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 55, 64 (2010).
40. See id. at 56.
41. Id. at 56–57.
42. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
43. The plaintiffs had alleged an alternative theory, namely that the geographic market 
assignments recognized by the Telecommunications Act were appealing, and each knew that 
upsetting that state of affairs would be bad for all. See id. at 567–68. In any event, the complaint 
alleged no facts supporting this theory. See id. at 569. On interdependence, see 6 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 1411; Hovenkamp, supra note 39, at 65–66.
44. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 873, 881 (2009).
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other products that, if true, would justify such a finding.45 Therefore,
under Twombly, a pleading must not merely provide notice of the 
contours of a complaint, it must also provide sufficient allegations from 
which the judge can infer that if the alleged facts are true, the claim is 
plausible.46
The law of pleading of exclusionary practices is somewhat less 
developed, but Twombly appears to require allegations that, if true, show 
that the defendant engaged in one or more anticompetitive practices that 
tended to create or preserve monopoly power, and that the plaintiff was 
injured by the practice. A fortiori, if the challenge is under the per se rule, 
the complaint must also plead a per se offense.47 Of course, a complaint 
can have multiple counts, some of which are to be assessed under the rule 
of reason while others are per se.
Twombly pleading standards create a difficult situation for plaintiffs 
who need access to discovery in order to identify the facts they must 
allege.48 This is particularly true for conspiracies or other practices whose 
success depends on secrecy.49 The defendants may tightly hold evidence 
of such conspiracies, and a plaintiff ordinarily would not have access to 
it when the complaint is drafted.50 A dismissal prior to discovery may 
entail that the evidence never will be revealed. However, some courts 
have acknowledged this issue and responded by stating that the 
conspiracy allegations must simply be plausible.51 The question at the 
                                                                                                                     
45. See, e.g., Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 744 F.3d 702, 710–11 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(“Under our post-Twombly precedent, rule-of-reason antitrust plaintiffs must always ‘present 
enough information in their complaint to plausibly suggest the contours of the relevant geographic 
. . . market[ ]. . . . [O]ur antitrust precedent requires plaintiffs to plead factual support for all 
manner of market claims.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
46. See Alexander A. Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767, 1768–69
(2014) (speaking of plausibility pleadings in contrast to notice pleading); see also Arthur R. 
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on 
the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 331–32 (2013) (further discussing 
the contrasts between plausibility pleadings and notice pleadings).
47. See Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 321–24 (2d Cir. 2010); Rick-Mik 
Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2008); Kendall v. Visa 
U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2008).
48. Hovenkamp, supra note 39, at 56.
49. Id. at 58.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 189–90 (2d Cir. 
2012) (“[T]he question is whether there are sufficient factual allegations to make the complaint’s
claim plausible. . . . [O]n a Rule 12(b)(6) motion it is not the province of the court to dismiss the 
complaint on the basis of the court’s choice among plausible alternatives.”).
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pleading stage is whether the allegations are sufficient to entitle the 
plaintiff to discovery.52
The pleading problem is generally different for per se cases than for 
rule of reason cases. In a per se case, the question is typically whether an 
anticompetitive agreement such as price fixing exists, and the defendants 
are strongly motivated to keep such agreements secret. Proof of 
agreement may be impossible without access to discovery.53 By contrast, 
in a typical rule of reason case the existence of the agreement is not in 
dispute; rather the case turns on whether it is anticompetitive under the 
circumstances. This approach places a premium on objective tests based 
on evidence that is typically not in the defendant’s exclusive control. As 
a general matter, evidence of market structure and product substitutability 
should be sufficiently available to the plaintiff to support a plausible 
claim.54 The same thing would ordinarily be true of an exclusionary 
practice, whose impact must affect someone other than the defendants.
In sum, the test for adequate pleading in a rule of reason antitrust case 
should be whether objective evidence of market structure and 
exclusionary effect—both of which can ordinarily be obtained without 
access to the defendant’s own records—indicate that an antitrust violation 
is plausible. Having established that, the plaintiff should be entitled to 
discovery.
B. Question of Law
While pleadings are dominated by factual allegations, the ultimate 
question of which antitrust rule applies is one of law.55 When deciding 
whether to apply a per se rule, the Supreme Court often refers to “judicial 
experience” as the determinative factor.56 Juries do not have “judicial 
                                                                                                                     
52. See, e.g., Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 45 (1st Cir. 
2013); cf. NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (opining that mere 
“possibility” of entitlement to relief insufficient).
53. See, e.g., Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 227 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that mere fact that physician groups and insurer had opportunity to conspire 
insufficient to establish an agreement to do so); Hovenkamp, supra note 39, at 60.
54. Cf. Mich. Div.-Monument Builders of N. Am. v. Mich. Cemetery Ass’n, 524 F.3d 726, 
732–33 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding plaintiff’s pleadings inadequate to entitle them to discovery on 
relevant market issue); Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323, 334–35 (D. Vt. 
2010) (holding pleadings sufficient to entitle rule of reason plaintiffs to discovery on relevant 
market issue).
55. See, e.g., Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 772 (8th Cir. 
2004) (whether rule of reason applies is a question of law), aff’d, 491 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2007). 
56. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (“Once 
experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the 
rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is 
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experience.” Indeed, most of them do not have any experience at all on 
the issue. And because experts testify only on issues of fact, expert 
testimony regarding the per se versus rule of reason question is
inadmissible,57 although expert testimony on facts can certainly aid the 
court in determining which rule to apply.
The ultimate question about whether to apply the per se rule depends 
on whether the challenged practice has characteristics suggesting a more 
elaborate inquiry under the rule of reason will be either unnecessary or 
counterproductive.58 Juries have no ability to make this determination,
given that they are examining only the facts of the case before them, but 
this hardly makes the fact finder irrelevant. Within the rule of reason 
analysis, the question of whether a restraint is “reasonable” is ordinarily 
one of fact.59 Juries may be asked to consider several subsidiary 
questions, such as whether a restraint is naked or is ancillary to other 
productive activity,60 whether a challenged practice reduces costs or 
improves product quality, or whether the defendants are actually 
competitors. For example, while an expert may not testify that a particular 
practice is unlawful per se, she certainly may testify that there is no 
integration of business among the defendants, or that a claimed efficiency 
is really not what it is stated to be. Alternatively, she might provide and 
                                                                                                                     
unreasonable.” (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982))); 
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01, 100 n.21 (1984) (commenting 
that “judicial experience” determines which rule is to be applied); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“[I]t is only after considerable experience with certain 
business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.” (quoting 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972))); California ex rel. Brown v. 
Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Per se analysis examines whether prior 
judicial experience with the type of restraint at issue is sufficient to allow a determination that it 
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition . . . .”); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 316 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing that “judicial experience” teaches when 
application of rule of reason is unnecessary).
57. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 694 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(excluding economist’s testimony to the effect that certain activity should be analyzed under the 
rule of reason).
58. See discussion infra note 60 and accompanying text.
59. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (“[T]he rule of 
reason requires the factfinder to decide whether under all the circumstances of the case the 
restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition.”).
60. See, e.g., In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 752 F.3d 728, 733–34 (8th 
Cir. 2014) (discussing that while choice of rule presents question of law, “underpinning that 
purely legal decision are numerous factual questions”); Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive 
Machs., Inc., 221 F.3d 913, 919 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing that once the court had determined 
that the rule of reason applied, it was up to the jury to determine whether a five-year 
noncompetition agreement contained in a patent license was unreasonable).
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support efficiency explanations that, if accepted, would take a case out of 
the per se rule.
C. Irrational Summary Judgment Rules
The rough equivalent to Twombly in summary judgment cases is 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,61 which 
considerably raised the bar for plaintiffs wishing to get their antitrust 
claims in front of a jury. The prior law had indicated that summary 
judgment should be used “sparingly” in antitrust cases, because “motive 
and intent play leading roles” and the evidence is held by “alleged 
conspirators” and “hostile witnesses.”62 As a result, evaluating a case 
depended crucially on jury evaluation of the truthfulness of testimony.63
In sharp contrast, Matsushita moved the focus away from witness
veracity and toward objective, market-based factors tending to establish 
whether the plaintiff’s claim together with supporting evidence had 
crossed a plausibility threshold.64
Once a motion to dismiss is granted, the plaintiff has no automatic 
right to amend, but judges typically permit at least one amended 
complaint.65 By contrast, at the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs 
typically get only one bite at the apple. This can have perverse 
consequences for antitrust discovery and proof. The problem unfolds like 
this: An antitrust plaintiff who believes it has a per se case pursues it 
through discovery that way, making it unnecessary to prove market 
power or a relevant market, or to show anticompetitive effects. This also 
makes it unnecessary to invest in expert testimony to establish these 
things. Later on, when discovery has proceeded to the point that a motion 
                                                                                                                     
61. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
62. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
63. See id. at 467.
64. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (“[I]f the factual context renders respondents’ claim 
implausible—if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense—respondents must come 
forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be 
necessary.”).
65. See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Capacitors 
Antitrust Litig., 154 F. Supp. 3d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing AT&T Corp. v. JMC Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 
525, 531 (3d Cir. 2006)) (“While pleading exclusively per se violations can lighten a plaintiff’s
litigation burdens, it is not a riskless strategy. If the court determines that the restraint at issue is 
sufficiently different from the per se archetypes to require application of the rule of reason, the 
plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed.”); cf. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 206 F. Supp. 
3d 1033, 1051 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (concluding that a plaintiff who mistakenly pleads under the per 
se rule may have a second chance to plead under the rule of reason, provided that it did not 
completely disavow its intent to pursue a rule of reason complaint in the alternative).
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for summary judgment is in order, the court agrees with the defendant 
that the case should have proceeded under the rule of reason. As a result,
it dismisses the complaint because essential elements of a rule of reason 
case are missing.66 For example, in the Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc.67
joint venture case, the plaintiff had brought its claim under the per se rule 
or, alternatively, a “quick look” rule.68 The district court had granted 
summary judgment after concluding that the plaintiffs had “disclaimed 
any reliance on the traditional ‘rule of reason’ test.”69 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court, finding a fact issue as to application of the per 
se rule.70 The Supreme Court then reversed the Ninth Circuit and 
dismissed the complaint.71
The problem with this sequence of events is that if there is any 
reasonable chance that the court will ultimately require the rule of reason, 
the plaintiff has no choice but to proceed through discovery under that 
rule even if the chance is small. This means that the value of the per se 
rule is lost in a significant number of cases because the plaintiff must do 
all of the things that rule of reason analysis requires, including developing 
expert testimony on questions about relevant market, market power, and 
anticompetitive effects, even though the case may ultimately be decided 
under the per se rule. At least prior to trial, the greatest cost in litigating 
a rule of reason case is the cost of developing a record; therefore, most of 
the cost savings that the per se rule promises will have been lost.
One way to address the problem is for courts to hold that, once the 
court has granted a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a per 
se complaint, the plaintiff should be permitted to amend to include a rule 
of reason count. Assuming the amended complaint is sustained, it could
then develop a record under the rule of reason. Such a rule should 
naturally be subject to the judge’s discretion. The defendant can of course 
                                                                                                                     
66. See, e.g., Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s 
dismissal of antitrust claim on rule of reason grounds); Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. 
Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 334 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming grant of summary judgment to plaintiff 
after concluding that rule of reason applies); Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 
1145, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 
F.2d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 1993).
67. 369 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
68. Id. at 1113.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1125.
71. Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 
F.3d 942, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2000) (having failed to persuade the Supreme Court to evaluate dental 
association’s restraint under a “quick look,” the FTC would not be permitted to augment the record 
to show a violation under the rule of reason).
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offer evidence indicating that the plaintiff should have known all along 
that the case must be tried under the rule of reason.72 The court must 
decide whether the plaintiff’s initial allegations were objectively 
justified, even though subsequently found to be mistaken. If so, the case 
should be remanded for additional discovery addressing the rule of reason 
issues.
D. Stare Decisis
Stare decisis attaches more strongly to issues of statutory construction 
than to interpretation of constitutional provisions. Congress can much 
more easily change statutes when it disagrees with what the Supreme 
Court has done.73 Indeed, the Clayton Act itself was in significant part a 
response to a Supreme Court decision that Congress found unappealing.74
One effect of this reluctance is that formal antitrust doctrines, such as the 
per se rules against resale price maintenance and tying, linger long after 
they have become economically indefensible. For example, since the 
1960s,75 there has been relentless economic criticism of the antitrust per 
se rule against resale price maintenance, which was announced in 1911.76
However, the Supreme Court did not overrule Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co.,77 for another half century.78 In other cases, the 
Court adheres to economically deficient rules, even acknowledging their 
deficiencies but observing that Congress has chosen not to change the 
                                                                                                                     
72. For example, in Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1117, even the Ninth Circuit chose the wrong rule.
73. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (“[S]tare decisis
carries enhanced force when a decision, like Brulotte, interprets a statute. . . . [C]ritics of our 
ruling can take their objections across the street . . . .”); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 
U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory 
interpretation, for . . . Congress remains free to alter what we have done.”); see also Cont’l T.V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 60 (1977) (White, J., concurring) (objecting that majority 
was not taking seriously the principle that stare decisis applies more strongly in cases of statutory 
construction).
74. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 467, 468 (2015); see generally Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912) (approving 
patent ties), overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
518 (1917); HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 225–33 (examining the congressional response to 
Henry decision). 
75. See, e.g., Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 86, 86 (1960). 
76. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400, 406–08 (1911), 
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
77. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
78. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 882.
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law.79 Another effect that shows up frequently in antitrust is that the 
courts take advantage of the very open-ended language of the antitrust 
laws by qualifying former holdings, often severely, without overruling 
them.80
In the antitrust rules dividing per se illegality from the rule of reason, 
stare decisis operates as a unique one-way ratchet. When the Court 
deviates from earlier decisions and applies the per se rule, stare decisis is 
not a factor. A situation in point is the progression from White Motor Co. 
v. United States81 to United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.82 to 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.83 In White Motor the Supreme 
Court found a manufacturer’s nonprice vertical restrictions to be 
reasonable.84 That decision was overruled only four years later by 
Schwinn, which applied the per se rule with no discussion of stare 
decisis.85 A decade later the Court reversed itself again, applying a rule 
of reason in GTE Sylvania.86 Now, however, the Court felt compelled to 
discuss stare decisis concerns, and Justice White raised them in his 
concurring opinion.87
This unbalanced treatment of stare decisis is inherent in the logic of 
the per se rule. Stare decisis does not attach to a court’s conclusion that it 
is refusing to apply the per se rule because courts have insufficient 
experience with the practice at issue. As soon as courts acquire more 
experience they may change their mind. Going back in the other direction 
is much more difficult, however, because judicial experience has now 
presumably been established. The Supreme Court has seldom overruled 
                                                                                                                     
79. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409–10, 2413 (2015)
(adhering to rule originally expressed in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30, 34 (1964), that 
agreements calling for royalties based on expired patents are per se unenforceable).
80. E.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
408–10 (2004) (severely qualifying but not overruling the unilateral refusal to deal doctrine 
developed in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–11 (1985)); 
see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86, 588 (1986) 
(severely qualifying but not overruling the summary judgment approach that the Court had 
adopted in Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)).
81. 372 U.S. 253 (1963), overruled by United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 
365 (1967), overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
82. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977).
83. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
84. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 264.
85. See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 378–79.
86. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49.
87. See id. at 47–49, 60. Justice White’s concurrence found the majority’s brief handling of 
Schwinn an “affront to the principle that considerations of stare decisis are to be given particularly 
strong weight in the area of statutory construction.” Id. at 60.
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previous antitrust decisions to apply the per se rule.88 In Kimble v. 
Marvel,89 a non-antitrust case analogous to patent misuse, the Court held 
that stare decisis forbade it from overruling the widely criticized rule that 
license agreements calling for patent royalties after expiration of the 
patent are unlawful per se.90 In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 
v. Hyde,91 Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion suggested that stare decisis precluded the Court from overruling 
the much criticized per se rule against tying arrangements, even though 
by that point very little economic support for the rule remained.92 Later 
in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,93 the Court danced 
around the subject, rejecting a “per se rule” that patents automatically 
confer market power.94 But the general per se rule for tying arrangements 
when market power is present very likely still survives.
Application of stare decisis to questions concerning the scope of the 
per se rule requires the court to classify the arrangement at hand. For 
example, tying is (irrationally) unlawful per se while exclusive dealing is 
subject to the rule of reason. Yet distinguishing between the two practices 
can be difficult.95 This same problem has undermined intelligent analysis 
                                                                                                                     
88. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) 
(overruling per se rule against resale price maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 
(1997) (overruling per se rule against maximum resale price maintenance); GTE Sylvania, 433 
U.S. at 58 (overruling per se rule against vertical nonprice restraints).
89. 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
90. Id. at 2409–11. On the role of stare decisis in Kimble, see Herbert J. Hovenkamp, 
Brulotte’s Web, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 527, 527 (2015).
91. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
92. See id. at 9 (“It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the 
proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and 
therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”). However, the Court then went on to approve the tie because 
the defendant’s market share was too small. Id. at 31–32. The Jefferson Parish rule still garners a 
small amount of support. See Einer Elhauge, Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish: Why Ties Without 
Substantial Foreclosure Share Should Not Be Per Se Legal, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 464–65 
(2016).
93. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
94. Id. at 40 (rejecting “presumption of per se illegality of a tying arrangement involving a 
patented product”). However, the Court also explicitly embraced “the standards applied 
in . . . Jefferson Parish,” even though that decision had expressly recognized the existence of a 
per se rule against tying arrangements of unpatented products where market power was found on 
the basis of traditional market share measurements. See id. at 42; Elhauge, supra note 92, at 498–
501.
95. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 44–45 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting 
that arrangement before the Court involved exclusive dealing rather than tying); see also Race 
Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 75–76 (3d Cir. 2010) (plaintiff alleged 
tying in what was in fact an exclusive dealing case); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 
758 F.2d 1486, 1491, 1504–05 (11th Cir. 1985).
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of vertical intrabrand restraints. For thirty years prior to the Supreme 
Court’s Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.96 decision, 
vertical “price” restraints were per se unlawful while nonprice restraints 
were subject to a rule of reason.97 As a result, parties threw considerable 
litigation resources into disputes about whether the arrangement before 
them was a price or a nonprice agreement.98 Subsequent to Leegin that 
distinction has become relatively unimportant.
This entire approach to stare decisis and the rule of reason is 
wrongheaded because it attaches far too much precedential value to a 
formal classification rather than to a mode of analysis.99 The rationale for 
per se illegality is well understood. A properly defined rule of stare 
decisis should apply the per se rule to “naked” restraints, which are 
restraints whose profitability depends on the exercise of market power.100
By contrast, if the case realistically suggests that profits might come from 
reduced costs or product improvement, then the rule of reason is proper. 
Selection of the appropriate rule should consider whether a robust 
literature exists showing that the challenged practice can be beneficial as 
well as harmful. For tying arrangements, resale price maintenance, and 
exclusive dealing this is clearly true. For horizontal agreements affecting 
prices, dividing markets, or excluding rivals, the defendants must offer 
evidence of some form of integration or legitimate activity that makes a 
procompetitive theory plausible. If they cannot, condemnation under the 
per se rule is appropriate.
For example, at this writing, stare decisis might be thought to justify 
the per se rule for tying arrangements, as the Supreme Court suggested in 
its 1984 Jefferson Parish decision.101 The fact is, however, that tying is 
not a naked restraint. It is a ubiquitous part of business practice, serving 
to protect product or service quality, to reduce production or distribution 
costs, to meter usage, or to support presumptively output increasing price 
                                                                                                                     
96. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
97. Id. at 901.
98. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735–36, 748 (1988) 
(majority concluding that defendant’s restrictions on price cutting were a nonprice restraint; 
dissent objecting that they were a price restraint); 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 
1620–27 (noting numerous issues in distinguishing price from nonprice restraints).
99. For elaboration, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE 
AND EXECUTION 120–21 (2005) (pointing out that stability and integrity override technical 
correctness regarding stare decisis); see generally Barak Orbach, Antitrust Stare Decisis, 15 
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (2015) (identifying a broad range of issues to which stare decisis applies).
100. HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, at 112.
101. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984).
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discrimination.102 Further, it is not sensibly anticompetitive in the 
absence of tying product market power. As a result, it should be accorded 
rule of reason treatment. Attaching the per se rule to a mode of analysis 
rather than a category of restraints can help courts avoid unilluminating 
conclusory analysis, such as distinguishing between tying and exclusive 
dealing, or between price and nonprice restraints. Such a rule would be a 
much better way to use judicial resources efficiently.
II. BURDENS OF PROOF, QUALITY OF EVIDENCE, AND THE “QUICK LOOK”
A. Cost Savings from the Per Se Rule?
Antitrust policy should strive to reduce the social costs of 
anticompetitive behavior, which has two distinct components. One is the 
net social costs of anticompetitive price increasing or output reducing 
conduct and the private measures taken to defend against it, offset by any 
economic benefits. Second are administrative costs, including error costs, 
of operating the enforcement system.
One must assume that a full-blown rule of reason inquiry is much
costlier than analysis under the per se rule. Applying the rule of reason 
typically requires expert testimony identifying a relevant market or
alternative mechanisms for estimating market power, as well as some 
evidence that purports to measure actual anticompetitive effects.103 By 
contrast, the per se rule requires only proof that a particular type of 
conduct has occurred. Thus, the rule of reason is justifiable only to the 
extent that it provides superior outcomes.
Administrative costs include not only the costs of litigation, whether 
terminated by settlement, dispositive motion, or trial, including appeals, 
but also the cost of detecting violations, of determining whether to sue, 
as well as of antitrust compliance with whatever the rule happens to be. 
Error costs are particularly relevant to compliance costs. For example, an 
unduly harsh tying rule may influence firms to avoid socially beneficial
tying. By contrast, an overly lenient predatory-pricing rule may yield 
excessive anticompetitive predation.104
                                                                                                                     
102. See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1703, 1711–18 (assessing numerous 
procompetitive rationales for tying); Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying 
Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 964 (2010) (pointing out several benefits 
of tying).
103. See Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 31, 31–32 (2014).
104. On the case for under-deterrent predatory-pricing rules, see 3A AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 723b. 
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Excessive complexity can increase error costs just as much as 
excessive simplicity. Antitrust cases in the United States are decided by 
generalist judges, many of whom lack economics training.  Further, facts 
are often determined by juries, who frequently lack any relevant training 
whatsoever. In such cases increased complexity can produce poorer 
rather than better outcomes.105 As a result, a per se rule that is easily 
administered but right only 80 percent of the time may actually be 
preferable to an open-ended rule of reason query with an arbitrary and 
indeterminate error rate.
Accuracy is also affected by the care with which the boundaries of the 
per se rule and rule of reason are defined. For example, the poorly 
conceived per se rules that the Supreme Court adopted for tying 
arrangements during the 1950s and 1960s,106 or in joint venture cases 
such as Topco,107 produced very high error costs, certainly far higher than 
any savings in administrative costs gained by use of a per se rule. By 
contrast, a well-designed per se rule can produce considerable net cost 
savings even if it is not absolutely perfect. The most prominent example 
is the per se rule against naked price fixing, which finds illegality simply 
on evidence that the defendants fixed their prices.108
Historically, some per se rules have been so far from perfect that they 
simultaneously imposed large administrative costs, all the while making 
markets no more competitive. This occurs when the decision to apply the 
per se rule was wrong to begin with, yielding significant resistance. Such 
per se rules gradually become subject to many exceptions, and litigating 
them can be as costly as litigating under the basic rule of reason.
A case in point is manufacturer specification of the price that a dealer 
must charge, or resale price maintenance (RPM). The Supreme Court 
adopted a poorly articulated per se rule against it in 1911.109 Eight years 
later, however, its United States v. Colgate & Co.110 decision announced 
that only “agreements” to impose RPM were unlawful, and a firm that 
simply refused to deal with price cutters was acting unilaterally.111 That 
                                                                                                                     
105. Cf. Abraham L. Wickelgren, Determining the Optimal Antitrust Standard: How to 
Think About Per Se Versus Rule of Reason, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 52, 54 (2012) 
(identifying why cases of predatory pricing are rare). 
106. See discussion infra notes 109–22, 283 and accompanying text.
107. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (condemning 
competitively harmless joint venture market division agreement under the per se rule).
108. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, at 112–14.
109. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 394, 408 (1911),
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
110. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
111. Id. at 306–07.
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decision produced a ninety-year-long litigation nightmare in which the 
parties devoted many costly efforts to determining whether resale price 
had been imposed unilaterally or by agreement, rather than whether the 
pricing practice at issue was really anticompetitive.112 Included in this 
debate were heavily litigated issues concerning whether the dealer in 
question was actually a reseller or merely an “agent” whose prices could 
lawfully be controlled.113 In all but a few cases, the agency issue had no 
impact on the competitive effects of the resale price maintenance being 
challenged.114 Later, after the Supreme Court had clarified that vertical 
nonprice restraints should be subject to the rule of reason,115 a similar 
battle ensued over whether a particular instance of dealer termination 
amounted to a “price” restraint (unlawful per se) or a “nonprice” restraint 
(rule of reason).116 For example, a dealer who refused to invest in a 
showroom or trained sales personnel might be able to charge a lower price 
for the manufacturer’s product. If the manufacturer terminates this dealer, 
is it for a “nonprice” reason (inadequate showroom and sales staff) or a 
“price” reason (charging low prices)?  In retrospect it is hardly clear that 
a century of per se treatment of resale price maintenance saved significant 
litigation resources at all, and absolutely no reason to think that it led to 
better outcomes.
Something similar happened with the law of tying arrangements, 
which were irrationally placed under a per se rule117 even as the closely 
related offense of exclusive dealing was analyzed under the rule of 
reason.118 The principal difference between tying and exclusive dealing 
                                                                                                                     
112. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 755, 768 (1984) (ruling on 
what standard of proof is required for liability due to vertical price-fixing). The voluminous case 
law is discussed in 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1442–50.
113. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 14–15, 24 (1964) (refusing to find 
consignment, or agency, exception); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485–86 (1926) 
(finding consignment exception to RPM rule). On the consignment or agency exception to RPM 
rules, see 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1470–74.
114. One exception is Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 
722, 725–26 (7th Cir. 1986) (pointing out economic reasons why airline travel agent is a mere 
agent whose prices can be set by the airlines, and not a buyer-reseller of tickets).
115. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
116. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735–36 (1988).
117. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958) (holding that tying 
arrangement was unreasonable per se), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2012), as 
recognized in Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Elecs. Indus., 49 F. Supp. 2d 893, 908, 913 (E.D. 
Tex. 1999); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608–09 (1953) (holding 
that tying leading to monopoly is illegal), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5), as 
recognized in Texas Instruments, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 908, 913; see also discussion supra note 29.
118. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (holding 
that only exclusive dealings that foreclose competition are illegal).
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is that tying requires the forced union of “separate products,” so a vast 
amount of litigation resources were devoted to this question.119 To be 
sure, there are some operational differences between tying and exclusive 
dealing, but the separate products query rarely does anything to 
illuminate them. Further, notwithstanding the nominally harsher 
treatment of tying arrangements, exclusive dealing can in fact have more 
severe consequences for competition. A tying arrangement attaches 
exclusivity to a particular product,120 while exclusive dealing typically 
applies to the entire dealership. For example, a tying requirement might 
force a seller of Lexmark computer printers to stock and sell Lexmark 
cartridges, but it would still be able to sell non-Lexmark printers and 
cartridges as well. By contrast, exclusive dealing could prevent the dealer 
from selling any non-Lexmark products at all.121 In that case the 
exclusionary power of the exclusive dealing is greater than that imposed 
by tying.
These problems should be addressed by this Article’s proposal that 
the per se rule be defined in terms of a mode of analysis rather as a 
classification of practices.122 For example, once the rule of reason is 
applied to both exclusive dealing and tying, the analysis of these practices 
would be very similar, with the courts searching principally for 
unreasonably exclusionary conduct.
B. The Assignment of Evidentiary Burdens
Of all the procedural issues involved in antitrust litigation under the 
rule of reason, none are more critical than questions about assignment of 
the burden of proof and production, and the quality of the evidence that 
must be presented at each stage. The requirements for a rule of reason 
                                                                                                                     
119. See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1741–51 (devoting 120 pages to the 
separate products issue).
120. However, a few tying cases try to make the tying product the business itself, at least in 
the context of franchising. See, e.g., Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 
705, 712 (11th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff arguing that trademark, equipment, and services were tied); 
Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting argument 
that trademark and ice cream were separate products); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 
43, 47–48 (9th Cir. 1971) (rejecting argument that trademarked business and supplies were 
separate products), abrogated by Rick-Mik Enter. v. Equilon Enter., 532 F.3d 963, 974 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 2008).
121. See Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1380, 1382 (5th Cir. 
1994) (discussing how defendant required dealer to carry defendant’s hamburger patty paper as a 
condition of carrying its patty-making machine, but customers remained free to purchase the two 
separately); Russell Pittman, Tying Without Exclusive Dealing, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 279, 281 
(1985).
122. See discussion supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
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case—market power and anticompetitive effects—can be very difficult 
to prove. Assignment of the burden is frequently dispositive of the 
outcome. Indeed, very likely the principal reason that plaintiffs go to such 
lengths to bring their case within the boundaries of the per se rule or the 
so-called “quick look”123 is that they cannot carry an evidentiary burden 
requiring them to demonstrate power and anticompetitive effects. For 
example, in the California Dental Association v. FTC124 case the Federal 
Trade Commission lost in its efforts to have the Court examine the claim 
under a “quick look” approach.125 That having failed, the FTC was later 
unable to make a case under the Supreme Court’s formulation for 
assessing proof burdens under the rule of reason.126
The black letter antitrust rule for proof under the rule of reason is 
easily stated. The plaintiff has the primary burden of alleging and then 
providing sufficient evidence both that the defendants have sufficient 
market power to make an anticompetitive restraint plausible127 and also 
that they have imposed at least one such restraint.128 Some decisions 
unfortunately express these requirements in the alternative, suggesting 
that the plaintiff can prevail by showing either that a restraint is 
anticompetitive or that the defendant has sufficient market power to pull 
it off.129 While market power is a necessary condition for an 
                                                                                                                     
123. See discussion infra Section II.E.
124. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
125. See id. at 769.
126. See id. at 759, 774. (discussing how FTC failed to show anticompetitive effects, as rule 
of reason required); Order Returning Matter to Adjudication & Dismissing Complaint at 1, In re
Cal. Dental Ass’n., No. 9259, 2001 WL 34686091 (2001).
127. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 788–89 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (requiring “enough market power to harm competition”). 
128. Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1998)
129. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2016), cert.
granted sub nom. Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017) (quoting Tops Mkts., 142 
F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1998) (“If the plaintiff cannot establish anticompetitive effects directly by 
showing an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole within the relevant market, he or she 
nevertheless may establish anticompetitive effects indirectly by showing that the defendant has 
‘sufficient market power to cause an adverse effect on competition.’”); accord Deutscher Tennis 
Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing that plaintiff may prove 
either market power or anticompetitive effects); K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. 
Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. 
Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 1993)) (“‘[W]here the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate 
[an actual adverse effect on competition,]’ . . . ‘it must at least establish that defendants possess 
the requisite market power’ and thus the capacity to inhibit competition market-wide.”); Flegel v. 
Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Either showing—market 
power or actual detrimental effects—shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate pro-
competitive effects.”); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993); Brookins v. 
Int’l Motor Contest Ass’n, No. CIV. C96-134 MJM, 1998 WL 937242, at *2 (N.D. Iowa July 15, 
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anticompetitive restraint under the rule of reason, it is never a sufficient 
condition.130 Joint ventures with significant market power may employ 
restraints that are in fact quite competitive, and thus are “reasonable” 
under the circumstances. Thus, the better rule is the one expressed in the 
Tops Markets, Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc.131 decision:
Even assuming this market share data implies that 
Quality [the defendant] possessed market power, Tops still 
would fail to satisfy its burden under the adverse-effect 
requirement. Market power, while necessary to show 
adverse-effect indirectly, alone is insufficient. A plaintiff 
seeking to use market power as a proxy for adverse effect 
must show market power, plus some other ground for 
believing that the challenged behavior could harm 
competition in the market. . . .132
If the plaintiff meets this initial burden to establish a prima facie case 
for competitive harm,133 then the burden shifts to the defendant to show 
a procompetitive justification for the practice.134 If the defendant is 
                                                                                                                     
1998) (“Accordingly, a plaintiff can show a violation of § 1 by showing ‘actual detrimental 
effects’ on competition attributable to the challenged restraint, or by showing that the ‘market 
structure and the defendant's market power’ are such that the challenged restraint is likely to injure 
competition.”), aff’d, 219 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2000); Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Virtua Health 
Inc., No. 11-1290 RMB/KMW, 2015 WL 1321674, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2015) (citing 
Deutscher, 610 F.3d at 830) (“As stated in this Court’s prior Opinion, [Docket No. 56], a plaintiff 
may demonstrate that concerted action produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within the 
relevant product and geographic markets in two ways: (1) through direct evidence of actual 
anticompetitive effects; or (2) through proof of the defendant’s market power, which acts as a 
proxy for anticompetitive effect.” (alteration in original)), aff’d sub nom., 833 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 
2016).
130. Tops Markets, 142 F.3d at 97.
131. Id. at 90.
132. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 129–30 (internal 
citations omitted) (“Even if market power were shown, it would not satisfy the adverse-effect 
requirement under these circumstances. . . . [A] plaintiff wishing to show adverse effect through 
indirect means ‘must at least establish that defendants possess the requisite market 
power’ . . . . [A] showing of market power, while necessary to show adverse effect indirectly, is 
not sufficient. There must be other grounds to believe that the defendant’s behavior will harm 
competition market-wide, such as the inherent anticompetitive nature of defendant’s behavior or 
the structure of the interbrand market. . . . This position is consistent with the approach of courts 
that require a showing of market power, but only as one of several steps necessary to establish 
adverse effect.”).
133. For example, in California Dental the burden never shifted because the majority 
concluded that the FTC failed to make out a prima facie case. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 
U.S. 756, 775 n.12 (1999). The four dissenters disagreed with this proposition. Id. at 783.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), 
modified, 183 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003); see also
California Dental, 526 U.S. at 788 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In the 
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unable to defeat the prima facie case and offers no justification, then the
plaintiff is entitled to prevail. By contrast, if the defendant does provide 
evidence of a procompetitive justification the burden may shift a second 
time.135 The plaintiff will still have an opportunity to show that the same 
justification could have been achieved by a less restrictive alternative, 
which is one that offers more-or-less the same benefits but without the 
threat of competitive harm.136 If no less restrictive alternative is available 
the court may need to examine both the restraint and the justification and 
attempt to “balance” them in order to assess net anticompetitive 
effects.137
One important question is whether these “secondary” burdens of proof 
should be assigned categorically or on a case by case basis. The latter 
makes more sense given the variability of antitrust rule of reason claims 
and location of evidence. As a general matter, inferences should be 
assigned against the person with the least plausible claim.138 This 
suggests both that proof burdens should be assigned to a party as its 
position is less tenable, and also that the “quality” of the proof be 
increased.
Inseparable from the issue of proof burdens is the question of the 
quality and amount of evidence that is needed to satisfy a party’s burden. 
Once again, the less plausible a party’s case, the more evidence is needed 
                                                                                                                     
usual Sherman Act § 1 case, the defendant bears the burden of establishing a procompetitive 
justification.”). Contra American Express, 838 F.3d at 206–07 (concluding that the plaintiff 
needed to show “net harm” to both sides of a two-sided market (merchant acceptance and 
cardholders), which meant that before the burden shifted, the plaintiff would have to show that 
harms on one sided exceeded benefits on the other).
135. On the broad acceptance of these burden-shifting requirements in rule of reason antitrust 
cases, see Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. 
REV. 1265, 1268–69 [hereinafter Carrier, Bridging the Disconnect]; Michael A. Carrier, The Rule 
of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 834–35 
(2009) [hereinafter Carrier, An Empirical Update].
136. American Express, 838 F.3d at 195 (“If the defendant can provide such proof, then ‘the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff[] to prove that any legitimate competitive benefits offered by 
defendant[] could have been achieved through less restrictive means,’” (alteration in original)
(citing Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 
1993))); see also C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM.
L. REV. 927, 941 (2016). 
137. But see discussion infra notes 270–82 and accompanying text; Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 383–84 (2016).
138. See Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 573 (2013) (discussing and critiquing Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 
YALE L.J. 738 (2012)); Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J.
1254, 1268 (2013).
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to create a triable issue.139 At least for summary judgment purposes, the 
Supreme Court made this clear in its Matsushita decision, which created 
an inverse sliding scale between the plausibility of the plaintiff’s 
allegations and the degree of proof necessary to avoid summary 
judgment.140 The defendants, who were Japanese manufacturers of 
electronic sound equipment, were accused of orchestrating a twenty-year-
long predatory-pricing campaign in order to drive American 
manufacturers out of business.141 The accusations were in effect of a
predation scheme that had virtually no chance of success.142 First, a 
twenty-year campaign would have required decades of monopoly prices 
before the defendants could have recouped their investment in 
predation.143 Second, the plaintiffs had offered no evidence indicating 
that entry into this market was difficult, “yet without barriers to entry it 
would presumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for 
an extended time.”144 Such an implausible claim would require a greater 
amount of evidence in order to avoid summary judgment:
[I]f the factual context renders respondents’ claim 
implausible—if the claim is one that simply makes no 
economic sense—respondents must come forward with 
more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would 
otherwise be necessary.145
                                                                                                                     
139. See Wickelgren, supra note 105, at 53 (“[W]e require stronger evidence of 
anticompetitive effects for conduct that we think are less likely to be anticompetitive and are more 
receptive to procompetitive effects arguments in such cases.”).
140. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
141. Id. at 577–78.
142. Id. at 592.  
143. Id. at 593 (“[P]etitioners would most likely have to sustain their cartel for years simply 
to break even.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 26–
27 (1984) (discussing that the recoupment period on the Matsushita facts would have to be 
infinitely long). For a strongly contrary view, see Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and 
Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1719 (2013). Leslie observes that Matsushita was a § 1
conspiracy case; further, even a long predation period might lead to profitable recoupment if the 
monopoly returns during the recoupment period are sufficiently high. Id. On the recoupment 
requirement in predatory pricing law, see 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 726–28.
144. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 591 n.15. 
145. Id. at 587; see also First Nat’l. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 278–79 
(1968) (discussing that where defendant had no motive to conspire, stronger evidence would be 
required to establish a conspiracy). As Judge Posner later explained: 
More evidence is required the less plausible the charge of collusive conduct. In 
Matsushita, for example, the charge was that the defendants had conspired to 
lower prices below cost in order to drive out competitors, and then to raise prices 
to monopoly levels. This was implausible for a variety of reasons, such as that it 
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The quality of the evidence can also affect the burden of proof. For 
example, once a plaintiff has established a relevant market with a 
sufficient minimum share, who has the burden of showing that entry is 
difficult or easy? If entry is easy, then even a high market share fails to 
establish significant power.146 The same thing applies to the question 
whether two different goods are sufficiently substitutable that they should 
be in the same market.147
C. Staging Evidentiary Obligations
1.  The Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case
The plaintiff’s prima facie case is only the first step in assessing a 
restraint challenged under the antitrust laws. Too many courts proceed as 
if this step constitutes the entire case. In fact, the prima facie case should 
focus on one question: Does the restraint before the court require an 
                                                                                                                     
would mean that losses would be incurred in the near term in exchange for the 
speculative possibility of more than making them up in the uncertain and perhaps 
remote future—when, moreover, the competitors might come right back into the 
market as soon as (or shortly after) prices rose above cost, thus thwarting the 
conspirators’ effort at recouping their losses with a commensurate profit. But the 
charge in this case involves no implausibility. The charge is of a garden-variety 
price-fixing conspiracy orchestrated by a firm, ADM, conceded to have fixed 
prices on related products (lysine and citric acid) during a period overlapping the 
period of the alleged conspiracy to fix the prices of HFCS.
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 646 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating 
that the Matsushita holding was based on twin premises of an alleged conspiracy that was 
fundamentally irrational and ambiguous circumstantial evidence; as the rationality of the alleged 
conspiracy increases, the evidentiary burden is lessened). In H.J., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
the Eighth Circuit went even further, suggesting that Matsushita “does not apply” in a case where 
the alleged conspiracy seems quite rational. 867 F.2d 1531, 1544 n.10 (8th Cir. 1989) (“There is 
no claim in this case that the supposed conspiracy makes no economic sense. Matsushita Electric
does not apply.”). Other decisions making the same distinction include Petruzzi’s IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1993), and Ezzo’s
Investments, Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 94 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 1996).
146. See 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 420b; see also United States v. Baker 
Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983–87 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting the government’s contention that 
once high market concentration was established in a merger case, the burden shifted to the 
defendant to show that entry would be “quick and effective” in restoring any monopoly prices to 
the competitive level).
147. HDC Med., Inc. v. Minntech Corp., 474 F.3d 543, 547–48 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that 
the plaintiff had the burden to show whether single-use and multiple-use dialyzers were 
substitutable); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 121 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that the 
plaintiff had the burden to show whether hotter burning and cooler burning coal were in the same 
market).
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explanation, or should the complaint be dismissed without further query? 
As a general matter, the evidence supporting a prima facie case need not 
be as specific as the evidence supporting a procompetitive justification. 
If the defendants have a procompetitive justification, it must have been a 
motivating factor for the restraint, and the defendants should be able to 
establish it rather easily. By contrast, most of the evidence pertaining to 
the prima facie case concerns the market in which the firms operate and 
the more obvious tendencies of the restraint at issue; sometimes much of 
the evidence is controlled by the defendants.
Thus, the quality and amount of the evidence varies at different stages 
in the production of evidence:
First, the evidence of market power should be sufficiently strong to 
create an inference that the defendants are capable of producing 
anticompetitive results by means of the claimed restraint.148 This requires 
that the market be well-defined or that an alternative method of assessing 
power be sufficiently robust. In most cases, evidence about market 
structure, entry barriers, or the extent and nature of IP rights is sufficiently 
available to plaintiffs to enable them to make out a prima facie case. Of 
course, defendant firms themselves may know many details more fully.
In any event, if an important element in assessing power is known 
exclusively by a defendant, the presumption on that issue should favor 
the plaintiff.
One reason for requiring strong proof of power is that as power is 
weaker, efficiency explanations tend to predominate. For example, if a 
group of firms have no power at all, then an anticompetitive output 
reduction cannot be an explanation for their conduct. The presence of 
power is what makes an anticompetitive restraint possible.
Second, once sufficient market power is found, a practice that can be 
reasonably expected to restrain output or increase price should be 
sufficient to shift the burden to the defendants without evidence of an 
actual output restraint or price increase. The question at this stage is only 
whether power and a sufficiently troublesome restraint exist such that the 
defendants should be expected to provide an explanation. Under the 
consumer welfare test advocated here, the focus of this proof is on the 
price or output effects of the restraint, not on some broader conception of 
general welfare.149
                                                                                                                     
148. On the question of varying the power requirement with the offense, see discussion infra
notes 435–56. See generally Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1303, 1304–05 (2017) (providing a ground-up analysis of the role of market power).
149. See discussion infra notes 204–67.
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The Supreme Court majority in the California Dental case thought 
otherwise.150 It found an insufficient prima facie case for competitor-
created restraints on advertising that made it virtually impossible for 
member dentists to advertise their prices and prohibited quality 
advertising.151 Evidence of such practices should require an explanation 
concerning why such restrictions benefitted rather than harmed 
consumers. Perhaps more to the point, what additional facts should the 
FTC have been required to show? Measuring actual output effects would 
be impossible, and in this case the plausibility argument would clearly 
seem to favor the plaintiff. By contrast, the defendants, who created the 
restraints in question, need do no more than provide an explanation that 
they presumably already knew for why these particular restraints 
protected rather than harmed consumers, and why these means were 
superior to other vehicles that would have interfered less with the 
competitive process. For example, if the purpose of the restraints was to 
prevent deception, was there a significant record of deception that federal 
or state consumer protection laws were unable to control?
The majority’s error in California Dental is that it rolled both the 
prima facie case and the justifications offered for it into one, giving the 
plaintiff the burden on both. The Supreme Court acknowledged the 
fragility of the market in question, focusing on imbalances in information 
as between suppliers and consumers that impeded effective consumer 
choice.152 In a quite stunning logical flip, however, it then concluded that 
a set of rules facilitating collusion among dentists might in fact be an 
effective way to control the situation.153 It reasoned that the challenged 
advertising restrictions “might plausibly be thought to have a net 
procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition.”154 That 
is, the same imbalances of information that made this market more 
conducive to collusion might serve to justify a set of restraints imposed 
collusively by sellers.
                                                                                                                     
150. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771–72 (1999).
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing Jack Carr & Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the 
Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J.L. & ECON. 307, 309 (1990) (“One feature common to the 
markets for complex services is an inherent asymmetry of knowledge about the product: 
professionals supplying the good are knowledgeable; consumers demanding the good are 
uninformed.”)). See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (illustrating the effects of “quality 
uncertainty” in markets characterized by asymmetrical information).
153. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 778–79; Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitor Collaboration 
After California Dental Association, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 181.
154. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 771.
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In part, the Court’s decision may reflect naïveté about professionals—
perhaps that they can be expected to act in the public interest rather than 
as self-serving business persons. The history of professional restraints 
suggests strongly that professionals are maximizers, just as other business 
firms are. When professionals have an opportunity to profit by limiting 
output or controlling price, they take it.155 In any event, whether a 
particular professional rule reflects the public interest or self-interested 
maximization is appropriately a fact to be proved as part of a defense, and
not simply assumed. For that, the burden should be on the defendants. 
Agreements by professional associations with power that virtually 
eliminate price advertising or that condemn quality advertising require an 
explanation. In this case, power, self-interested decision makers, and 
price-affecting conduct should be sufficient to create an inference.
The approach that the Supreme Court took in the NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma156 case is more sensible. The 
Court found a prima facie anticompetitive restraint in a rule that limited 
each team’s annual number of nationally televised games.157 As the Court 
observed, “[b]ecause it restrains price and output, the NCAA’s television 
plan has a significant potential for anticompetitive effects.”158 In the 
presence of market power, that is certainly so. As a result, the NCAA was 
obliged to provide a defense.159
If the challenge is to conduct thought to be exclusionary rather than 
collusive, a rule of reason plaintiff should be required to show that at least 
one substantial and presumptively efficient rival or potential rival has 
been excluded. For example, in SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc.160 the 
Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiffs, who issued the competing 
Discover card, made out a prima facie case of an exclusionary practice 
with respect to Visa’s rule forbidding Visa membership to any bank that 
                                                                                                                     
155. As evidenced most recently in N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 
1101, 1108 (2015) (discussing dentists’ agreement to prohibit non-dentists from offering teeth 
whitening services); see also PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 251–60 (Dave Garza, 
et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012) (providing an overview of the physician services market and the economic 
factors that affect it); Thomas G. McGuire, Physician Agency, in 1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 461, 475–77 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (discussing 
physician behavior in the context of market power); Thomas Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: 
Antitrust Law and Physician Cartels, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189 (2007) (discussing 
physicians’ long history of willingness to “blatantly disregard” antitrust laws).
156. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
157. Id. at 98.
158. Id. at 104.
159. Id. at 113.
160. 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995).
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also issued a competing card.161 To be sure, there might be justifications 
for such a rule, but the important point at this stage is that they are 
justifications—that is, they serve as explanations for an exclusionary 
practice, not as an element of the practice itself.
2.  Justifications
Once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of competitive 
harm, the burden shifts to the defendants to provide evidence of a 
justification.162 This burden should be stricter than the one applied to the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case. Restraints are adopted self-consciously, and 
we must assume that the defendants are rational and knew what they were 
doing when the challenged restraints were created. To the extent that the 
defendants’ expectation of profit came from something other than a
restriction of competition, they should have evidence and are in the best 
position to provide it.
Acceptance of justifications presents issues of both proof and policy. 
Not every proffered justification will save a restraint, even if the 
justification has factual support. For example, in NCAA the defendants 
offered the rationale that restrictions on the number of broadcasts per 
team were necessary in order to level the playing field between more 
popular and less popular teams; further, the restrictions were needed to 
protect live ticket-paying attendance, which eroded when televised 
alternatives were available.163 The Court properly rejected these
rationales, not because the defendants failed to meet their burden to prove 
them, but on policy grounds.164 As a general matter, it is not a defense to 
collusion that its purpose is to protect weaker participants. Every cartel 
does that by creating a price umbrella that permits less efficient firms to 
survive. As to live attendance, a high cartel price always serves to 
strengthen demand for non-cartelized substitutes. We rely on the market 
to make these adjustments. For example, an automobile cartel might 
result in increased demand for pickup trucks, but that fact is not a defense 
to price fixing.
The most salient point about both of the NCAA’s defenses is that they 
assumed that the challenged restraint actually reduced output or raised
prices in the affected market. Only an output limitation could create 
broadcasting space, so that less popular teams could have their games 
                                                                                                                     
161. Id. at 961.
162. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113; SCFC, 36 F.3d at 969.
163. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 115–17.
164. Id.
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nationally televised, or force viewers to switch from television to live 
attendance. An effective defense must be able to show that a practice has 
social benefits that do not depend on the exercise of market power.165
For challenges to horizontal restraints, the need to control free riding 
is an often asserted but greatly overused defense.166 True free riding 
requires one firm to take advantage of another firm’s investment in ways 
that reduce the incentive to invest.167 As a result, where competitively
harmful free riding occurs, one would expect output to be lower. Further, 
in order for anticompetitive free riding to occur, the free rider must be 
able to take advantage of someone else’s investment in such a way that 
the other firm is not capable of pricing it out of the market.168 This 
inability to obtain an adequate return reduces the incentive to invest.169
Often, instances of claimed free riding are really complaints about 
competition, particularly when there are joint costs. For example, in 
SCFC, the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of competitive harm from 
a Visa rule that forbade banks issuing Visa cards from issuing competing 
cards.170 At that point, the burden shifted to the defendant to provide a 
justification, and the court accepted its defense that permitting competing 
                                                                                                                     
165. Cf. Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“[T]he Rule 
[of Reason] does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged 
restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged 
restraint’s impact on competitive conditions.”); id. at 696 (“In sum, the Rule of Reason does not 
support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.”). 
166. For vertical restraints the manufacturer, or vertically related firm, has a separate interest 
that serves to justify many free rider concerns. See, e.g., H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens 
Med. Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1014 (2d Cir. 1989). If the manufacturer does not have those 
concerns, the free rider argument is best rejected. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 
928, 938 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s free rider explanation when it was a retailer 
complaining about free riding by other dealers, but the manufacturers did not have the same view).
167. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 211 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (accepting free rider justification for national van lines requirement that local mover 
affiliates transfer their interstate shipments exclusively to Atlas’s authority for operation under its 
name and agreement to its rates); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 
(7th Cir. 1985) (accepting the free rider argument for a horizontal product division agreement 
within a single shopping center as necessary to permit each firm to capitalize on its own 
promotion). See Wesley J. Liebeler, Antitrust Law and the New Federal Trade Commission, 12 
SW. U. L. REV. 166, 195−96 (1981) (demonstrating the use of ancillary product division 
agreements to avoid free riding).
168. See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining 
that if an asset can be priced out, then the ride is not free).
169. Id. at 674.
170. Id. at 961 (questioning the validity of the challenged bylaw which provided that “if 
permitted by applicable law, the corporation shall not accept for membership any applicant which 
is issuing, directly or indirectly, Discover cards or American Express cards, or any other cards 
deemed competitive by the Board of Directors . . . .”).
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cards would encourage free riding.171 But the court never required 
evidence of actual free riding or explained how it would occur, upon what 
assets a free ride might be taken, or why Visa could not have taken 
reasonable steps either to prevent or charge a fee for their use. If there are 
joint costs, the venture can usually require cost sharing rather than 
denying access altogether. For example, a merchant who takes one credit 
card might receive card-swiping machines for that card. If the merchant 
then took a competitor’s card that made uncompensated use of the same 
machine, there is a possibility of free riding. But free riding would not be 
a problem if the second card issuer could be compelled to share the costs 
of the machine, or if the merchant bore the machine’s costs. In a later 
challenge to the same rule brought by the United States, the court could 
not identify any Visa asset upon which the competing card issuers 
(Discover and American Express) were able to take a free ride.172
In other cases, claimed “free riding” is nothing more than product 
complementarity. For example, producers of gasoline sell more of it to 
the extent that we have a robust market for automobiles, and vice versa. 
One might describe this as “free riding” because the gasoline producers 
are earning a profit from the automobile manufacturers’ investment. But 
the overall effect is to increase rather than decrease overall output, thus 
making this form of free riding a good thing.173 While product 
complementarity enables one firm to profit from another firm’s 
investment, the effect is generally to increase rather than decrease the 
incentive to invest.174
                                                                                                                     
171. The court reversed a district court judgment on a jury verdict that rejected the free rider 
claims. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 967 (D. Utah 1993), rev’d, 36 F.3d 
at 972 (10th Cir. 1994).
172. United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), modified,
183 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 
811 (2004); see also United States v. Am. Exp. Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 235−36 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(finding that “anti-steering” rules used by card issuer to deter merchants from accepting rivals’ 
cards were not necessary to limit free riding because record showed that defendant could and did 
price assets subject to free riding separately), rev’d on other grounds, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016);
cf. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Toys “R” Us’s free
rider argument that distribution restraints needed to be imposed on rival retailers in order to 
prevent them from taking advantage of Toy “R” Us’s promotional investments when the 
manufacturers themselves believed that widespread distribution was the output-maximizing 
strategy; its interest was not in more efficient distribution but rather in maximizing its own 
profits).
173. See, e.g., Wilk v. AMA, 895 F.2d 352, 364 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting free rider 
argument used in defense of rule prohibiting physicians from referring patients to chiropractors).
174. See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189−90 (7th Cir. 
1985) (demonstrating the benefit of productive cooperation between retailers).
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In any event, complete market exclusion is a suspiciously excessive 
remedy for claimed free riding, even where a certain amount of free riding 
actually occurs. For example, one Second Circuit decision accepted a free
rider argument for a professional baseball league’s consolidation of all 
intellectual property rights held by member teams into a single 
organization with exclusive rights to license.175 The court credited the 
claim that the value of an individual team’s IP rights was in part a 
function of the IP rights held by other teams as well.176 For example, “a 
Club that was popular because of its on-field success could cash in on its 
popularity even though its victories obviously could not have been 
achieved without the participation of other Clubs.”177 Factually, that is 
true, but it is tantamount to saying that the value of a winner’s enhanced 
intellectual property rights must be shared with losers. The output-
maximizing approach would permit each team to capitalize on its own 
efforts without having to share its successes.
On the other hand, free riding is a legitimate concern for joint ventures 
that involve a high degree of risk at the startup stage. Firms will have an 
incentive to wait until risks have been overcome and then join later rather 
than earlier. But if the antitrust laws guarantee a right of late entry, each 
firm will have an incentive to free ride on the risk capital of early 
participants.
Other types of justifications can be both more conventional and more 
robust, provided that they can be factually supported. For example, joint 
ventures are often justified by reductions in either production and 
distribution costs or market transaction costs.178 In such cases, however, 
the costs in question are those borne by the defendants and must have 
been a motivating factor in creating the joint arrangement in the first 
place.179 To that extent, the defendant should have the burden of 
justifying them with probative evidence.
While the defendant has the burden of proving a justification for its 
restraint, at this stage it should not need to show that the effect of the 
justification is to offset fully the concerns that led the restraint to be 
                                                                                                                     
175. MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 304−05 (2d Cir. 2008).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 305; see also Laumann v. NHL, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(rejecting free rider defense of inter-team territorial restrictions on TV licensing where the 
proffered defense was that individual teams would be able to take a free ride on the popularity of 
the league if they were able to license their games nationally). 
178. See, e.g., Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 188 (explaining that “[i]t is necessary for people to 
cooperate in some respects before they may compete in others, and cooperation facilitates efficient 
production”).
179. Id. at 188−89.
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challenged. The entire logic of rule of reason proof is to put off and 
minimize the occasions for weighting and balancing pro- and 
anticompetitive effects. In the very troublesome Second Circuit decision 
in United States v. American Express Co., the Court lost sight of this and
effectively forced balancing into the very first stage of inquiry. It held
that a prima facie case required a showing of “net harm” with respect to 
a restraint that caused competitive harm on the merchant acceptance side 
of a credit card market, but with claimed benefits to cardholders.180 That 
approach virtually guarantees that antitrust cases involving two sided 
markets will become unmanageable. To be sure, some proffered 
justifications may be so strong or so weak that they make further inquiry 
unnecessary, but that will hardly be true in every case.181
3.  Less Restrictive Alternatives
Once the defendant has established a justification, the plaintiff can 
still show that similar effects could have been achieved by a less 
restrictive alternative, with that burden ordinarily on the plaintiff.182
Consistent with the consumer welfare principle, an alternative should be 
considered less restrictive if it accomplishes most of the defendant’s
legitimate goals while also providing lower prices, higher quality, or 
significantly less exclusion of competition.
The most difficult questions respecting less restrictive alternatives 
have to do with robustness and quality. First, may merely hypothetical 
less restrictive alternatives be offered, or must the plaintiff show that such 
an alternative is really being used successfully in some other setting? 
Second, must the proffered alternative be just as effective as the restraint 
that the defendants have chosen, or is a somewhat less effective 
alternative acceptable?183
One of the most robust less restrictive alternatives is non-exclusive 
                                                                                                                     
180. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub 
nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017).
181. See Wilk v. AMA, 895 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that sometimes the 
likelihood of anticompetitive effect is so obvious that the rule of reason analysis is unwarranted).  
182. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that, 
on remand, the government would have the burden of proving that less restrictive alternatives 
existed to the defendants’ agreement with competing institutions regarding financial aid provided 
to needy students). 
183. For excellent treatment, see Hemphill, supra note 136, at 945. See also Gabriel A. 
Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 
AM. U. L. REV. 561, 602 (2009).
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agreements in lieu of the defendants’ actual exclusive ones.184 This is 
particularly true in the case of horizontal arrangements involving IP 
rights, such as blanket licenses or patent pools.185 A non-exclusive license 
generally gives a firm all that it needs to improve its own technology. It 
needs an exclusive right only to exclude outside practitioners of the IP 
right in question. The absence of exclusive rights is particularly important 
in cases involving large numbers of participants. For example, in both 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.186 and
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,187 the defendants 
numbered in the thousands.188 In such cases, giving each cartel member 
an unlimited right to make non-cartel sales would make price fixing 
highly unlikely.
To be sure, exclusivity cannot be dispositive in either direction. 
Exclusivity may be necessary to avoid free rider problems when the 
defendants are engaged in a production joint venture or joint innovation. 
For example, two firms engaging in joint research and development may 
legitimately seek to preserve their improvements to themselves, and thus
require exclusive licensing.
By contrast, firms pooling the results of their independent research or 
individually developed IP rights raise different concerns. They clearly 
have a right to improve their own technology, but exclusion of others can 
raise significant fears. In Broadcast Music, nonexclusivity was important 
to the result because the copyrighted music in question was independently 
developed and subsequently licensed by rights holders who were not 
engaged in any joint productive activity other than the blanket license 
agreement itself.189 In such cases, nonexclusivity may be necessary to 
address concerns about collusion, particularly when the venturers as a 
group have significant power. By contrast, for joint research that is 
contemplated but not completed, the right to preserve the results to the 
members is very likely essential to the creation of proper incentives.
                                                                                                                     
184. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 360 (1982) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (protesting that a large group could not effectively reduce output, given that the 
arrangement was nonexclusive).
185. E.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979) (observing 
that the licenses in question were nonexclusive); see Hemphill, supra note 136, at 952.
186. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
187. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
188. Id. at 339 (stating that defendants’ association contained 1,750 physicians, representing 
roughly 70% of physicians in the county); Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 5 (stating that BMI contained 
20,000 authors and composers, ASCAP contained 22,000). 
189. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 5; Hemphill, supra note 136, at 952–53.
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In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,190 the Supreme Court 
approved, without economic discussion, an arrangement in which 134 
Appalachian region coal producers designated a single agent to represent 
them as sales broker.191 The designated agent was exclusive for all of the 
coal that the participating members produced.192 There was some doubt 
about whether the association had much market power.193 If it did, 
however, then a query into less restrictive alternatives should have been 
necessary. The defendants had grouped themselves together to sell their 
coal collectively at a single price,194 which was certainly enough for a 
prima facie case of collusion threatening conduct. The obvious defense 
was that a single sales agent could reduce transaction costs. At that point, 
however, the Court should have inquired whether a nonexclusive 
arrangement could have received substantially the same results, but 
without permitting output limitations that threatened competition. Free 
riding might be a problem, but that would be a question of fact to be 
proven. The defendants’ membership was too large to make a traditional 
cartel workable. However, an exclusive joint sales agency would create a 
single price setter and surreptitious non-agency sales could be readily 
detected. In that case, exclusivity was the factor that might have made 
collusion possible.
When free riding is the proffered defense, courts should first ensure 
that the claimed free riding is what the defendants say it is.195 Even if it 
is, however, less restrictive alternatives may be available. Free rider 
claims can be difficult to assess because free riding may increase output 
in the short run while decreasing it in the longer run. This difference is 
most pronounced in the case of vertical restraints.196 For example, the 
price-cutting dealer who lacks a showroom offers customers lower prices 
today, but also reduces the full service dealers’ incentive to make optimal 
investments in their businesses. The manufacturer in this case ordinarily 
has the correct set of incentives, which are aligned with “optimal” 
distribution rather than lowest prices in the short run.197 When the 
relevant participants are competitors rather than vertically related firms, 
                                                                                                                     
190. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
191. Id. at 377. 
192. Id. at 357–58.
193. See id. at 357 (noting that defendant’s market share was 74.4%, which was certainly 
enough, but only 11.96% of a somewhat larger geographic region).
194. Id. at 357–58.
195. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 165–173.
196. See Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics 
of Retailing Services, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 736, 736 (1984).
197. Id. at 752.
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then free rider claims become more difficult to assess because the same 
practices that purportedly solve free rider problems can also serve to blunt 
competition.
For many situations, workable less restrictive alternatives falling short 
of market exclusion should be available to address free rider claims. The 
most obvious one is mechanisms for pricing out any asset upon which a 
free ride is claimed.198 In other cases, provision of information might be 
more effective than coercive enforcement by market exclusion.199
In other situations, such as anticompetitive tying, quality 
specifications might be a less restrictive alternative.200 Here, however, 
one must ensure that the alternative actually addresses the particular 
defenses that have been offered.201 Considering quality specification as a 
less restrictive alternative makes sense if quality control is the claimed 
justification for a tie. But tying can be used for other purpose for which 
the quality control defense is inapt. For example, in Siegel v. Chicken 
Delight, Inc.,202 a non-dominant franchisor required its franchisees to 
purchase certain consumable supplies from itself rather than simply 
specifying their quality and permitting the franchisees to purchase them 
elsewhere.203 The court also acknowledged, however, that the tie was 
                                                                                                                     
198. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 166–67. But see Barry v. Blue Cross of 
Cal., 805 F.2d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that reimbursing non-network physicians at 
the same rate as network physicians was not a viable less restrictive alternative because under it 
no physicians would have an incentive to join the network).
199. See Wilk v. AMA, 895 F.2d 352, 356, 363–64 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that requiring 
“education” would be less restrictive than absolute exclusion of chiropractic); Kreuzer v. Am. 
Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requiring minimum number of 
hours of practice would be less restrictive alternative to rule that limited periodontics practice to 
those who practiced periodontics exclusively). 
200. See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 n.42 (1984) 
(acknowledging quality specification as an occasional alternative to tying); Mozart Co. v. 
Mercedes-Benz of North Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1987); Siegel v. Chicken 
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971) (specifying quality of tied product would be less
restrictive alternative than mandating that buyers purchase it from the defendant); see also 9 & 10 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1716d, 1717d, 1760d, 1760e (discussing quality or 
source specifications as less restrictive alternatives in tying cases); Hemphill, supra note 136, at 
941–42.
201. Hemphill, supra note 136, at 937.
202. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1987).
203. Id. at 49 (addressing the market power requirement by concluding that ownership of a 
trademark conferred sufficient power. That portion of the decision was effectively overruled by 
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006)); see Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. 
v. Equilon Enters, LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 971–72 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that Illinois Tool 
Works effectively overruled Siegel).
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being used as a metering device for measuring the franchisee’s sales.204
To that extent, quality specifications would not be a satisfactory less 
restrictive alternative. At the same time, of course, it suggested that the 
tie was not anticompetitive to begin with, particularly in light of the 
defendant’s small market share.205
D. Identifying Anticompetitive Restraints: Administrability and 
Consumer Welfare
In rule of reason analysis, the point of using a sequence of prima facie 
case, offsetting justifications, and less restrictive alternatives is to assess 
whether the challenged restraint reduces output or increases price from 
the non-restraint level. This approach is consistent with antitrust’s 
consumer welfare principle, which identifies antitrust’s goal as 
competitively low prices and high output, whether measured by quantity 
or quality.206 It is not necessarily consistent, however, with a general 
welfare principle, under which a restraint that actually produces higher 
prices or lower output is permissible, provided that efficiency gains to 
producers are at least as large as consumer losses.
This is not the place to debate whether consumer welfare or general
welfare ought to be the goal of the antitrust laws.207 Suffice it to say that, 
whatever its ultimate value, the consumer welfare approach has one
enormous advantage over a general welfare principle—
administrability.208 In order to assess a restraint under the consumer
welfare principle, one need query only whether prices are higher (or 
output lower) as a result of the restraint.209 This is far easier than 
quantifying all consumer losses and producer gains, and netting them out 
against each other.
Netting out consumer and producer welfare changes requires 
                                                                                                                     
204. See Siegel, 448 F.2d at 46 (noting that the defendant tied the supplies in lieu of charging 
a variable franchise fee or royalty); id. at 52 (observing that in a damages measurement, requiring 
an offset for the value of the franchise fee can be allowed).
205. Id. at 49.
206. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2471, 2471 (2013).
207. See id. at 2473; Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 67–68
(1982); Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 659, 690 (2010). On merger policy and consumer welfare, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703 (2017).
208. Hovenkamp, supra note 206, at 2473.
209. Id.
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information about the shape of the demand curve as well as the 
defendants’ costs and a prediction of how the challenged restraint will 
change those figures.210 Measuring consumer harm under a general 
welfare test requires not only predicting whether the price will rise or fall, 
but also what will be the size of the “deadweight” loss cause by inefficient 
consumer substitutions. There are almost no cases that have ever 
attempted to assess general welfare in reasonably close situations,211 and 
very likely no United States cases at all where a court has actually found 
an anticompetitive output reduction and price increase that was justified 
by offsetting efficiencies.212 By contrast, applying the consumer welfare 
tests asks only whether the price impact of the restraint will be upward or 
downward.213
To illustrate, consider Figure One below. The Figure, which is a 
variant of Oliver Williamson’s famous welfare tradeoff model, illustrates 
the measurement differences between the consumer welfare and general
welfare tests for a joint venture restraint that yields both efficiencies and 
increased market power.214 Prior to the implementation of a challenged 
restraint, this market exhibited prices (P1) equal to costs (C1). The 
challenged restraint does two things. First, it increases the firms’ 
collective market power, raising the price from P1 to P2 and reducing 
output from Q1 to Q2. Secondly, however, it generates productive 
efficiencies that reduce the firms’ costs from C1 to C2. Triangle A1
represents the traditional deadweight loss caused by this change; it 
                                                                                                                     
210. See Hovenkamp, supra note 207, at 703; see also Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Sunny Knott, 
An Economic Justification for a Price Standard in Merger Policy: The Merger of Superior 
Propane and ICG Propane, in 21 ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (RESEARCH IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS) 409 (2004) (discussing some of the extraordinary difficulties encountered when 
calculating consumer welfare changes).  
211. Of course, there are some easy cases that are not close. For example, in a highly 
competitive market where the defendants lack any power, consumer harm will be zero and any 
producer gain will serve to make the impact of the challenged restraint positive. 
212. Canadian antitrust law adopts a total welfare approach and has produced one highly 
controversial decision permitting a merger that resulted in an actual price increase on the theory 
that producer gains outweighed consumer losses. Comm’r of Competition v. Superior Propane, 
Inc., 2003 CanLII A-219-02 (Can.); see Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrie, Rhetoric and 
Reality in the Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 423 (2005); Darwin V. Neher, David M. Russo & J. Douglas Zona, Lessons from 
the Superior-ICG Merger, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 289 (2003). The United States 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines reject such an approach and call for a challenge to any merger that will raise 
consumer prices. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 10 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/
100819hmg.pdf.
213. See Hovenkamp, supra note 206, at 2473.
214. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 21 (1968). 
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consists of sales lost to consumers and thus not producing profits to the 
defendants either. Rectangle A2 represents the efficiency gains that result 
from the challenged practices, and rectangle A3 represents a transfer of 
wealth from consumers to producers.
Under a consumer welfare test the restraint is illegal if P2 is higher 
than P1, or Q1 is larger than Q2. The amount does not matter. All we need 
to know is that P2 exceeds P1, which tells us that, whether or not the 
restraint yields efficiencies, they are not significant enough to offset the 
price increase fully. We do not need to know the size of the price increase 
(P2-P1) or output reduction (Q2-Q1). Nor do we need to know anything 
about the size of A3, the wealth transfer, which is a function of both the 
amount of the price increase and the range of output over which it occurs. 
The size of A1, the deadweight loss, is also irrelevant.
FIGURE ONE
By contrast, a general welfare test for illegality requires a showing 
that consumer losses exceed producer gains.215 For that we must quantify 
producer gains, rectangle A2, which means that we must measure the per 
unit size of efficiency gains, which is the height of the rectangle, and the 
output over which those gains will be realized, which is its width. We 
also need to identify and segregate those savings that affect marginal 
(variable) costs, which show up in the price. In addition, we must quantify 
the consumer deadweight loss, A1. For that we need to know the size of 
the price increase in question (P2-P1), and the number of units by which 
the restraint reduces output (Q2-Q1). These are the two legs of the 
                                                                                                                     
215. See Hovenkamp, supra note 207, at 34–35.
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deadweight loss “triangle.” As for the “hypotenuse,” in the ordinary case 
this figure is not a triangle at all because the demand curve is nonlinear. 
So we also need to know the demand curve’s shape and location in the 
demand range covered by the deadweight loss.216 The set of
measurements necessary to compute a general welfare change makes the 
task heroic in all but the most obvious cases.
This is not to say that identifying competitive harm under a consumer
welfare test will always be easy. For example, a restraint might be a
collective exercise of market power that puts upward pressure on prices, 
but it might result in efficiencies so substantial that the resulting price 
will be lower than it was prior to the restraint. Such a restraint would be 
lawful under both the consumer welfare test and a general welfare test. 
But given that market power has been established, the defense would 
require evidence that the efficiency effect outweighed the market power 
effect by enough to hold prices to pre-restraint levels.217 Even so, 
assessing net price effects would be much simpler than assessing net 
welfare effects.
Should use of a consumer welfare test be presumptive rather than 
absolute? Perhaps there are cases in which the amount of market power 
created by the restraint is relatively small while the efficiency gains are 
both provable, extremely large, and cannot be achieved by a less 
restrictive alternative. The important qualifier, however, is that in such 
cases prices under the restraint are also likely to be lower rather than 
higher. The case of a total welfare increasing restraint that actually raises 
prices must be regarded as extremely rare and should never be accepted 
without the clearest proof.
E. Approaches to the Prima Facie Case: Bipartite, and the Tripartite 
“Quick Look”
The entire debate about antitrust “modes of analysis” is at bottom 
about presumptions, burdens of proof, and appropriate judicial responses 
to concerns about plausibility and location of the evidence. Antitrust 
cases are complex, and judges depend critically on presumptions and 
other evidentiary shortcuts. As relatively fewer things are presumed in 
the plaintiff’s favor and the evidentiary demands become greater, we are 
moving into rule of reason territory. We move in the opposite direction 
                                                                                                                     
216. Under a general welfare test we do not need to compute the size of A3, which benefits 
producers and harms consumers by the same amount and is thus a wash.
217. This is the approach to efficiencies applied to mergers assessed under the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 212, § 10 (2010); 
Hovenkamp, supra note 206, at 2476.
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when a greater number of things are presumed in the plaintiff’s favor and 
the evidentiary demands are less. The extreme is the per se rule, under 
which both power and anticompetitive effects will be presumed upon 
proof that a certain type of conduct has occurred.218
1.  “Quick Look” vs. “Sliding Scale”
Beginning with the Trenton Potteries decision, the Supreme Court 
divided antitrust analysis into two modes, the per se rule and the rule of 
reason.219 These two modes were generally treated as creating silos, with 
a large amount of empty space between them, particularly if one contrasts 
the blunt expression of the per se rule in Trenton Potteries220 with the 
expansive, open ended statement of the rule of reason that Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis articulated in Board of Trade of City of Chicago 
v. United States.221
The high cost and indeterminacy of antitrust litigation under the rule 
of reason led to exploration of that empty space for useful shortcuts. Even 
if a restraint is not clearly within the per se category, perhaps a full-blown
analysis of power and anticompetitive effects is unnecessary as well. 
Lower courts, the FTC, and commentators have often suggested that 
antitrust analysis in fact occupies three silos: the rule of reason, per se 
illegality, and an intermediate “quick look,” which has been described in 
different ways by different courts.222 These intermediate quick look cases 
are said to bear some of the characteristics of per se unlawful restraints, 
but there may be an additional complicating factor that deserves 
additional examination.223 In some cases the restraint is sufficiently 
unique that judges lack sufficient judicial experience with it.224 In that 
situation further examination is required, although perhaps not a full-
                                                                                                                     
218. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
219. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927); see discussion 
supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
220. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. at 397–98 (“The power to fix prices, whether reasonably 
exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable 
prices. . . . Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves 
unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular 
price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government in enforcing 
the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become unreasonable 
through the mere variation of economic conditions.”).
221. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
222. Compare N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 373 (4th Cir. 2013), 
aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015), with In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 275 (6th Cir. 
2014).
223. See, e.g., Procaps S.A. v. Patheon, Inc., 845 F.3d 1072, 1084 (11th Cir. 2016).
224. Id.
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blown rule of reason inquiry.
The Supreme Court has never embraced a three-silo quick look.225
While the Court has not rejected the idea categorically, its various 
statements have been quite critical.226 Only three Supreme Court 
decisions have explicitly acknowledged the quick look, and then only to 
reject it under the circumstances.227
An alternative view, initially developed in the Antitrust Law treatise, 
is that the modes of antitrust analysis represent a continuum, or “sliding 
scale,” with different fact finding requirements for different situations.228
The Supreme Court majority embraced that idea in Supreme Court Justice 
Stephen Breyer’s opinion for the Court in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,229 as well 
as Supreme Court Justice David Souter’s opinion in California Dental,230
from which Justice Breyer dissented.231 The California Dental discussion 
of the issue is more elaborate, making clear that the Supreme Court did 
not intend some form of tripartite analysis:
As the circumstances here demonstrate, there is generally 
no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give 
rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive 
effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What 
is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking 
to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint. The 
object is to see whether the experience of the market has 
been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident 
conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will 
follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a 
more sedulous one. And of course what we see may vary 
over time, if rule-of-reason analyses in case after case reach 
identical conclusions. For now, at least, a less quick look was 
                                                                                                                     
225. See discussion infra note 227.
226. See discussion infra note 227.
227. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (declining to apply “quick look,”
but then holding that the restraint could be unlawful under the rule of reason); Texaco, Inc. v. 
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (observing, and not questioning, that the district court had refused 
to apply quick look doctrine; going on to approve the joint venture agreement at issue); Cal. Dental 
Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (declining to grant FTC’s request for “quick look” 
analysis and requiring full rule of reason; FTC subsequently dismissed the complaint).
228. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 1500, 1507. The same position was expressed 
in the three previous editions, all in ¶ 1507. See also Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780 (quoting 8
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 1620 (“[T]he quality of proof required should vary with 
the circumstances.”).
229. 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
230. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780–81 (1999).
231. Id. at 781–94.
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required for the initial assessment of the tendency of these 
professional advertising restrictions.232
Justice Breyer did not disagree with the majority’s rejection of a quick
look approach.233 Neither did he agree, however, that a broad query was 
necessary in order to determine whether “the restraints at issue are 
anticompetitive overall.”234 Rather, he would have broken the query into 
four classical subsidiary antitrust questions: (1) What is the specific 
restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive effects? (3) Are 
there offsetting procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties have 
sufficient market power to make a difference?235
Even a superficial glance at the case law reveals very little justification 
for a categorical “quick look” silo. In fact, courts vary evidentiary 
requirements for both power and anticompetitive practices depending on 
the strength of the plaintiff’s case, the plausibility of various assumptions, 
                                                                                                                     
232. Id. at 780–81.
233. Id. at 781.
234. Id. at 782.
235. Describing the rule of reason process as: 
a series of questions to be answered in turn. First, we ask whether the restraint 
is “inherently suspect.” In other words, is the practice the kind that appears 
likely, absent an efficiency justification, to “restrict competition and decrease 
output”? For example, horizontal price-fixing and market division are 
inherently suspect because they are likely to raise price by reducing output. If 
the restraint is not inherently suspect, then the traditional rule of reason, with 
attendant issues of market definition and power, must be employed. But if it 
is inherently suspect, we must pose a second question: Is there a plausible 
efficiency justification for the practice? That is, does the practice seem 
capable of creating or enhancing competition (e.g., by reducing the costs of 
producing or marketing the product, creating a new product, or improving the 
operation of the market)? Such an efficiency defense is plausible if it cannot 
be rejected without extensive factual inquiry. If it is not plausible, then the 
restraint can be quickly condemned. But if the efficiency justification is 
plausible, further inquiry—a third inquiry—is needed to determine whether 
the justification is really valid. If it is, it must be assessed under the full 
balancing test of the rule of reason. But if the justification is, on examination, 
not valid, then the practice is unreasonable and unlawful under the rule of 
reason without further inquiry—there are no likely benefits to offset the threat 
to competition. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in NCAA found a 
plausible efficiency, considered it, found it wanting, and rendered a decision 
for the plaintiffs under the rule of reason without employing the full balancing 
test normally associated with the rule.
Cf. In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988), 1988 WL 
1025476, at *43.
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and the availability and possession of evidence.236 A case in point is 
Actavis, where the Court simultaneously said that the rule of reason rather 
than any “quick look” should apply, but then went on to indicate that 
sufficient market power and anticompetitive effects could be inferred 
from the size of an exclusion payment.237
The Court is not saying one thing and doing another. Rather it is doing 
what courts have always done in these settings. If the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case for anticompetitive effects is particularly strong, then it makes 
sense both to assign offsetting burdens to the defendant and also to 
require a stronger showing of benefit. Just the opposite applies when the 
plaintiff’s case is weak. By most measures, for example, the FTC’s case 
against the California Dental Association (CDA) was particularly strong, 
involving an explicit price and quality advertising restraints by self-
interested members of an association with market power.238 However, the 
rule of reason itself could accommodate such a case simply through 
proper adjustment of evidentiary burdens. Under the consumer welfare 
test the question would be whether the CDA rules tended to raise the price 
or reduce the quality of dental services.
One problem of sliding scale approaches is the demand they make on 
judges. If only Hercules can decide an antitrust case sensibly, then sliding 
scales will not work. A siloed “quick look” approach is not likely to make 
them any easier, however. To the contrary, the task is simpler to the extent 
the judge can divide the inquiry into smaller pieces, assessing evidentiary 
burdens at each stage. In fact, Justice Breyer in Actavis was quite 
optimistic about the ability of federal district judges to structure the query 
in a way that was relevant for the case at hand:
As in other areas of law, trial courts can structure antitrust 
litigation so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust 
theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on 
the other, consideration of every possible fact or theory 
irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on the basic 
question—that of the presence of significant unjustified 
anticompetitive consequences.239
In any event, one serious deficiency of the three-silo approach is that 
                                                                                                                     
236. E.g., New York v. Julius Nasso Concrete Corp., 202 F.3d 82, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(noting “dearth of market information” may lighten plaintiff's evidentiary burden).
237. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235–38 (2013).
238. Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 762 (1999); see discussion supra text 
accompanying notes 149–54.
239. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (citing 7 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1508c (3d ed. 2012)).
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it inclines judges to require a full-blown rule of reason whenever they 
reject a truncated query. That is what happened in California Dental and 
California ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc.,240 although not in Actavis.
Another problem with the so-called quick look is that it lacks 
definition. No single set of requirements defines it. Rather, the courts 
purporting to apply a quick look do what they should be doing under the 
rule of reason, which is fashioning the assignment of proof burdens 
piecemeal and making individual legal judgments about the quality of the 
evidence. The principal thing distinguishing the quick look from the other 
modes of analysis is the number of presumptions and evidentiary 
shortcuts. For example, in both FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists241
and Actavis, the Court purported to apply the rule of reason but 
nevertheless permitted truncated proof of both power and anticompetitive 
effects.242 In the 1984 NCAA case, the Supreme Court held that the rule 
of reason must be applied, because joint conduct was necessary to make 
delivery of the product possible.243 It further held that the defendant’s 
restriction on the number of nationally televised games was 
anticompetitive “on its face,”244 thus not requiring an estimate of output 
effects. It also held, however, that although the NCAA had market power 
with respect to the challenged broadcasts, “[w]e have never required 
proof of market power in such a case.”245 Then it later diluted the market 
power requirement, holding that evidence that intercollegiate football 
was “uniquely attractive to fans” justified limiting NCAA football to its 
own market.246 In sum, while expressing its mode of analysis as rule of 
reason, the Court in fact took numerous shortcuts individually adopted 
for the case at hand.
While the FTC has generally supported an identifiable “quick look” 
approach to antitrust, the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among 
Competitors, which were issued in 2000 by both Agencies, say this:
Rule of reason analysis entails a flexible inquiry and 
varies in focus and detail depending on the nature of the 
                                                                                                                     
240. 615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc sub nom, California ex rel. Harris v. 
Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011).
241. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
242. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38; Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459–64.
243. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–03 (1984). 
244. Id. at 113.
245. Id. at 110; see also Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460 (stating highly suspicious 
restraint “requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market 
analysis”); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Because competitive 
harm is presumed,” a detailed market analysis is not needed).
246. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 112.
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agreement and market circumstances. The Agencies focus 
on only those factors, and undertake only that factual 
inquiry, necessary to make a sound determination of the 
overall competitive effect of the relevant agreement. 
Ordinarily, however, no one factor is dispositive in the 
analysis.247
That sounds more like “sliding scale” than “quick look.” The 
Guidelines then elaborate:
In some cases, the nature of the agreement and the 
absence of market power together may demonstrate the 
absence of anticompetitive harm. In such cases, the Agencies 
do not challenge the agreement. Alternatively, where the 
likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from the nature 
of the agreement, or anticompetitive harm has resulted from 
an agreement already in operation, then, absent overriding 
benefits that could offset the anticompetitive harm, the 
Agencies challenge such agreements without a detailed 
market analysis.248
Resolution of the market power issue should affect the strength of the 
prima facie case. For example, a joint venture that controls 80–100% of 
a well-defined market should face close scrutiny of price-affecting or 
potentially exclusionary conduct. By contrast, if shares are more in the 
50% range or the market is not well defined, then the burden of making 
out a prima facie anticompetitive practice should be higher. The all-
important question is the venture’s ability to control the market with 
respect to the restraint in question. If ample opportunities exist for market 
participation outside the venture, a restraint there is less threatening.
As noted before, exclusive rights such as those involved in the 
Appalachian Coals decision should tip the balance in favor of 
illegality.249 By contrast, the nonexclusive rights granted in both the 
Broadcast Music (BMI) and Maricopa cases250 strongly suggest that the 
                                                                                                                     
247. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 




249. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 357–58 (1933), overruled by
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); see discussion supra text 
accompanying notes 189–91.
250. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 355–56 (1982); Broad. Music, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1979); see discussion supra text 
accompanying notes 185–86.
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restraints in those cases were competitively harmless.
In sum, the proposition that the “quick look” creates a distinctive silo 
somewhere in the isolated space between a rule of reason and a per se 
rule does not bear close analysis. The aggregate of decisions involving 
truncated proof clearly establish the contrary. For example, the Engineers
case condemned a professional association’s restriction on competitive 
bidding.251 The proffered defense, which was that aggressive bidding 
would force engineers to cut corners and risk safety, was tantamount to 
an admission that the restraint was naked: Its success depended on its 
ability to control price cutting.252 The Supreme Court concluded that the 
rule of reason would not countenance such a defense.253 In the process 
the prohibition on competitive bidding became the unrebutted prima facie 
and final case. While the Court did not speak of a “quick look” or 
articulate its mode of analysis, it was clearly applying something that fell 
between per se and full rule of reason analysis.
Both National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States254
and California Dental involved agreements that significantly increased 
customer search costs, while Maricopa involved an arrangement that 
decreased them.255 In the Engineers case, the ban on competitive bidding 
effectively meant that an engineer could not discuss pricing until after he 
or she had already been engaged and gotten started on a project.256 In 
California Dental, the limitation on advertising effectively meant that the 
dentist could not quote a price until he or she already had the patient under 
examination. In both cases the consumer was free to price shop for an 
alternative, but by that time there was substantial commitment to a 
particular seller, plus an uncertain search for a better deal from a rival. 
By contrast, the agreement in Maricopa reduced consumer search costs 
by giving patients a price list of physicians who guaranteed a particular 
price well in advance of immediate need, when they were still in a 
position to engage in comparison shopping.257 The Court erroneously 
applied the per se rule.258
                                                                                                                     
251. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692–93 (1978).
252. Id. at 693–94.
253. Id. at 696.
254. Id. at 679.
255. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 764 (1999); Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 349; Nat’l 
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 700.
256. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 682–84.
257. Maricopa, 457 U.S. 332, 340–42 (1982); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum 
Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 894 (1981).
258. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 364–66 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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2.  The “Quick Look” and Suspicious Joint Venture Activity
Most of the antitrust cases that have seriously considered a “quick 
look” approach involved restraints within the context of a joint venture, 
professional association, network, or other joint association whose 
legitimacy was not in question.259 The significance of this should be 
obvious. A naked restraint involving competitors who are not engaged in 
any form of joint production or legitimate rule making is fairly easy to 
evaluate. Everything about the arrangement is suspicious and there are no 
offsetting benefits. A court can readily apply the per se rule.260
Restraints created in the context of otherwise lawful joint associations 
are more problematic. The court needs to figure out how the challenged 
restraint functions within the larger collaboration. For example, few 
would dispute that the public can benefit from an association of 
professionals such as dentists with some involvement in the regulation of 
the quality of care, as well as some power to regulate unauthorized 
practice or improper commercial behavior. Further, meaningful 
regulation of quality necessarily entails some exclusion of substandard 
services. Much the same can be said of production joint ventures. Seen in 
this way, the “quick look” operates mainly as a device for looking more 
deliberately at suspicious restraints that are created in such ventures. A 
restraint on price advertising such as the one in California Dental261 may 
require a little more searching examination than a similar restraint among 
completely unaffiliated but competing retailers, such as grocers. This 
                                                                                                                     
259. Others have made this or a somewhat similar observation. See, e.g., James A. Keyte, 
“Quick Looks” and the Modern Analytical Framework for Assessing Legitimate Competitor 
Collaborations, 30 ANTITRUST 23, 24–26 (2016); Michael A. Lindsay & Erik D. Ruda, Antitrust 
Analysis of Joint Ventures: A Simple Progression, 30 ANTITRUST 12, 16 (2016); Alan J. Meese, 
In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick 
Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 866 n.165 (2016) (listing quick look decisions); see also In re Se. Milk 
Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 274 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing quick look analysis for price fixing 
and related practices in milk-distribution venture); N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 
F.3d 359, 373–75 (4th Cir. 2013) (approving FTC’s quick look approach to naked restraint in 
context of professional association), aff’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1107 (2015);
California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the quick 
look approach in favor of a more detailed inquiry regarding a revenue-sharing provision between 
competitors during the term of a labor dispute); Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 
1318, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (making production joint venture involving IP cross licensing 
subject to full rule of reason rather than a quick look); Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 
452, 463 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying per se rule to boycott; rejecting defendant’s argument for quick 
look when there was no distribution venture in place).
260. See PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting agreement 
between joint venturers making a naked restraint are suspicious and considered per se illegal).
261. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
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may be appropriate for no other reason than to give the defendants a 
chance to explain why this particular restraint is reasonably necessary to 
the operation of otherwise legitimate joint activity. If no explanation is 
accepted and it is clear the restraint is profitable only because it reduces 
output and raises prices, then summary condemnation is in order, 
typically with no inquiry into power.
A good illustration involving a production joint venture is the 
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC262 case. At issue was an agreement 
between two firms who were jointly producing a recording of three 
popular classical tenors263 that they would no longer promote separate 
recordings they had previously made of the same artists.264 Ordinarily an 
agreement between rivals not to advertise their competing products 
would be per se unlawful market division.265 In this case, however, the 
parties were also involved in the joint production of a new recording of 
the three tenors, and some of the individual recordings in the new product 
were the same as those in the original separately produced products.266
The defendants claimed that an agreement restraining promotion of their 
separately developed products was necessary to give the new, jointly
developed product a chance, citing a danger that the separate products 
would take a free ride on the jointly developed product.267 As the court 
observed, however, to the extent there was a danger of free riding, it
flowed in the other direction.268 The independently developed products 
had been on the market first.269 If there was a free rider danger it was that 
the new product would ride on the built-up consumer recognition of the 
older separate productions. In any event, the “free riding” that the 
defendants described was really nothing more than legitimate 
competition between the earlier separate products and the new jointly 
developed product.270
                                                                                                                     
262. 416 F.3d at 38; see also PolyGram Holding Inc., 136 F.T.C. 310, 355 n.52 (2003).
263. Luciano Pavarotti, Placido Domingo, and Jose Carreras. PolyGram Holding, 416 F.3d 
at 31.
264. Id. at 32.
265. E.g., Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating agreement among 
former but now separate law partners not to advertise in one another’s markets is unlawful per 
se).
266. Polygram, 416 F.3d at 32.
267. Id. at 37.
268. Id. at 38.
269. Id. at 31.
270. Id. at 38; see also Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 836 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(approving FTC’s quick look analysis for real-estate-association rule that excluded price cutters 
and nontraditional selling agencies); N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 359–61
(5th Cir. 2008) (holding physicians’ association that negotiated jointly for insurer contract 
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Nothing about this approach requires a third “quick look” silo. It 
indicates only the fairly obvious proposition that when a presumptively 
efficient joint venture includes a suspiciously anticompetitive looking 
restraint, the court should take a little extra care to see how the challenged 
restraint relates to the overall venture. That is fundamentally a rule of 
reason inquiry, but one that may be truncated if the facts so warrant.
F. Balancing
General statements of the rule of reason sometimes say that it 
routinely requires “balancing” of procompetitive and anticompetitive 
effects.271 Courts make these statements notwithstanding decades of 
                                                                                                                     
engaged in “inherently suspect” activity by collaborating on prices); United States v. Brown 
Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993) (approving quick look approach to ivy league university’s 
agreement limiting financial aid competition with respect to students who had been admitted to 
more than one of the participating schools); Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n v. FTC, 955 F.2d 457, 
471 (6th Cir. 1992) (approving FTC holding that car dealer limitation on showroom hours was 
unlawful, but under full rule of reason rather than FTC’s quick look approach); United States v. 
Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding restriction on membership 
in real-estate multiple-listing association facially unreasonable); cf. California ex rel. Brown v. 
Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc sub nom., California ex rel.
Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (competing stores’ establishment of a strike 
fund in the event of a labor dispute required full rule of reason treatment); Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 511 (4th Cir. 2002) (refusing to apply an abbreviated analysis 
where the defendant advanced plausible procompetitive justifications for baggage size regulations 
at a shared security check-in facility); Brookins v. Int’l Motor Contest Ass’n, 219 F.3d 849, 854 
(8th Cir. 2000) (refusing to apply abbreviated analysis to the association’s change of rules, which 
had the effect of excluding a rival supplier).
Many cases in sports networks rest on the Supreme Court’s NCAA conclusion that all 
restraints in such networks require rule of reason treatment because joint activity is needed to 
deliver product at all. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 
(2010); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 
(2016); Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 961 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding “extensive market and cross-elasticity analysis is not necessarily required” under an 
abbreviated analysis but refusing to apply an abbreviated analysis because of lack of experience 
with the product market in question); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming 
application of a “quick look” rule of reason analysis); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 
961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying a “‘quick look’ version of the Rule of Reason” to an 
agreement among owners of NBA teams limiting broadcast rights to NBA games).
271. See, e.g., United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 321 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016) (noting the need to balance is an element of rule of reason cases); 
ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 273 (3d Cir. 2012) (suggesting that creation of 
price-cost tests in exclusive discounting cases was an effort at “balancing of the procompetitive 
justifications of above-cost pricing against its anticompetitive effects”); United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[C]ourts routinely apply a . . . balancing 
approach” requiring plaintiff to “demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm . . . outweighs the 
procompetitive benefit”); Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 789 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(rule of reason requires a showing that “the restraint is unreasonable as determined by balancing  
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litigation showing such balancing to be unworkable and actual attempts 
at it to be rare.272 Once a court purports to engage in balancing it is almost 
always acting outside of its competence except in the most obvious cases. 
Balancing under a consumer welfare test is significantly easier than under 
a general welfare test, because the former requires prediction only of 
price or output effects.273 This is not to say, however, that balancing is 
easy, particularly for restraints that have survived the burden-shifting 
analysis that occurs prior to balancing.
Sixth Circuit Judge William Howard Taft noted over a century ago in 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.274 that some courts 
misconceived the role of antitrust analysis as determining “the proper 
limits of the relaxation of the rules for determining the unreasonableness 
of restraints of trade.”275 These courts “have set sail on a sea of doubt” by 
assuming the power to determine “how much restraint of competition is 
in the public interest, and how much is not.”276
Taft’s caution contrasted Justice Brandeis’s oft criticized statement of 
the rule of reason in the Chicago Board of Trade decision, which put 
everything up for balancing:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed 
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even 
destroy competition. To determine that question the court 
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its 
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the 
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular 
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all 
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save 
                                                                                                                     
the restraint and any justifications or pro-competitive effects of the restraint”); see also Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486–87 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating 
the difference between the rule of reason and the per se rule is that the former requires balancing). 
272. On the infrequency of balancing in the decisions, see Carrier, Bridging the Disconnect,
supra note 135, at 1364 (finding that actual balancing occurred in 4% of rule of reason cases); 
Carrier, An Empirical Update, supra note 135, at 828 (updating previous article in that rate of 
balancing declined to 2%). Contra United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir.
2016), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017) (Second Circuit’s 
requirement of “net harm” in a case involving a two-sided market would require balancing as 
early as plaintiff’s prima facie case).
273. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 204–16; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 
137, at 382–83.
274. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
275. Id. at 283.
276. Id. at 283–84.
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an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but 
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret 
facts and to predict consequences.277
A test that makes everything relevant provides nothing useful, because 
it gives no calculus for weighting or even identifying the important 
factors.278 In a complex world it is essential that antitrust tribunals keep 
their eyes on the ball, which under the consumer welfare test refers to 
restraints that realistically restrict output and increase price, and that are 
not essential to carrying on a joint venture’s legitimate functions.
Balancing is not even conceptually possible without a unit of 
measurement. That is, purely ordinal methods of balancing work only 
when the value on one side is zero. When both sides have some weight, 
however, we must have a way of netting them out. But it appears that
outside of the merger context no court has ever even attempted to put an 
actual number, such as dollars of economic loss or gain, on either the 
anticompetitive effects of a restraint or the justifications offered against 
it. A far better way to view the rule of reason is as a series of sequential 
steps intended to avoid balancing whenever possible. When balancing 
must be performed, the consumer welfare principle insists on a 
measurable unit, which is either price or output.279
The area that comes closest to permitting balancing is merger analysis  
under the Merger Guidelines.280 What makes this possible is that the 
given test for merger illegality is price effects, not general welfare
effects.281 The relevant question in merger cases is: After both 
                                                                                                                     
277. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also In re Sulfuric 
Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The rule of reason directs an 
assessment of the total economic effects of a restrictive practice that is plausibly argued to increase 
competition or other economic values on balance.”). In the context of vertical restraints, see Cont’l 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (“Under this rule, the factfinder weighs 
all of the circumstances of a case . . . .”).
278. Among the many critiques of the Chicago Board formulation are HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 5.6b
(5th ed. 2016) (“[O]ne of the most damaging in the annals of antitrust.”); Richard A. Posner, The 
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1977) (containing no useful guidance); Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason 
Violate the Rule of Law?, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1489 (2009) (failing to provide minimum due 
process standards of rational adjudication); Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and 
Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 743–44
(2012); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S. 
Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 655 (2012).
279. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 204–16.
280. See Hovenkamp, supra note 137, at 379–83.
281. Id. at 382.
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competitive harm and offsetting efficiencies are taken into account, are 
prices likely to go up or not? As noted above, using a test that focuses on 
prices or output rather than general welfare is essential if the rule of 
reason is to be administered rationally.282 Even in these cases, however, 
measuring the requisite effects is difficult.
Some decisions describe the rule of reason’s burden-shifting 
framework itself as a sort of “balancing,”283 but this is hardly the same 
thing. For example, in determining whether the plaintiff has made out a 
prima facie case, the court relies on evidence and a certain amount of 
intuition to determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence of power and an 
anticompetitive practice has crossed a threshold.284 At that point the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show a justification, although without 
determining magnitudes.285 None of this requires or even contemplates a 
cardinal weighing of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. Indeed, 
the sequence of evidentiary steps, with its shifting burdens, is an attempt 
to avoid balancing. The “less restrictive alternative” step which comes 
near the end shows an attempt to make this decision without having to 
quantify net competitive harm in dollars or welfare.286 The point is to 
show the existence or not of a less restrictive alternative without having 
to put a value on the difference.
A better way to view balancing is as a last resort when the defendant 
has offered a procompetitive explanation for a prima facie 
anticompetitive restraint, but no less restrictive alternative has been 
shown. At that point the basic burden-shifting framework has gone as far 
as it can. The court must then determine whether the anticompetitive 
effects made out in the prima facie case are sufficiently offset by the 
proffered defense. Even here, a hard look at the quality of the evidence is 
important. The court needs to make sure that the market is well defined, 
with convincing evidence of power, and that the threat of higher prices or 
anticompetitive exclusion is clear. The same thing is true of evidentiary 
support for the offered justification. Hopefully, few cases will survive 
this hard look and still require balancing, although the possibility cannot 
be excluded.
                                                                                                                     
282. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 204–16.
283. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 
1136 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (describing the “burden-shifting framework to conduct . . . balancing” in 
order to determine “if the restraint’s harm to competition outweighs its procompetitive effects”).
284. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 132–37.
285. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 132–37.
286. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 132–37.
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In the American Express case, the Second Circuit went to the opposite 
extreme, requiring cardinal balancing as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case.287 The case involves a “two-sided” market, in which a firm typically 
obtains revenue from two different, non-substitutable groups of 
participants. For example, a magazine might obtain revenue from both 
subscribers and advertisers. Further, the two sources trade against each 
other: more advertising might increase advertising revenue, but in the 
process it might turn off subscribers, thus decreasing subscription 
revenue.288 Credit card markets are two sided because the issuer needs 
to trade off the size of the fees charged to merchants with the size of the 
payments made to card holders. American Express charges merchants 
high acceptance fees but also gives generous and costly perks to
cardholders.  At least some merchants would prefer to give customers a 
discount for using a less costly form of payment, but Amex’s “anti-
steering” rules, which the government challenged, forbid it. As a result, 
cardholders had no incentive to switch to a cheaper card.289
In rejecting the government’s challenge, the court held that the 
plaintiff had the initial burden to show “net harm” to “both cardholders 
and merchants.”290 That is, the harms to merchants had to be balanced 
against benefits to cardholders as part of the government’s prima facie 
case.291 This entailed, of course, that both harms and benefits be 
quantified, effectively making balancing necessary in every such case.
Further, in this case the burden of competitive harm fell on the merchants, 
while the benefits accrued to cardholders.292
                                                                                                                     
287. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom.
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017).
288. See David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Markets with Two Sided Platforms, in 1
ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 667 (Wayne D. Collins et al. eds., 2008).
289. For a very good overview of the issues, see OECD, Policy Roundtables: Two-Sided 
Markets (2009), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf. Of the numerous briefs 
submitted to the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court, among the most helpful for understanding 
the issues in this case is Brief for Amici Curiae John M. Connor et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing, No. 15-1672-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2016), 2016 WL 6919642.
290. American Express, 838 F.3d at 206.
291. The court’s approach was doubly wrong because it placed merchants and cardholders 
in the same relevant market, notwithstanding that the two are not reasonably interchangeable but 
perform in the market more as complements than substitutes. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 1, ¶ 565.
292. For good discussion of the difficulties of  balancing gains in one market against losses 
in another, see Gregory J. Werden, Cross-Market Balancing of Competitive Effects: What Is the 
Law, and What Should It Be?, 43 J. CORP. L. 119, 140 (2017); Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The 
Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2016); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 
137.
136 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
III. THE SCOPE OF THE RULE OF REASON
A. The Declining Domain of the Per Se Rule
The high point of per se antitrust illegality occurred in the 1950s and 
1960s, when some joint ventures of competitors that were almost 
certainly efficient were determined to be unlawful per se, either because 
they divided markets293 or else constituted concerted refusals to deal.294
Among vertical practices, both minimum295 and maximum296 resale price 
maintenance were declared unlawful per se, as were many tying 
arrangements.297 For a decade, vertical nonprice restraints were thought 
to be unlawful per se.298 Under the United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank299 test, even mergers were subject to a quasi-per se rule if the market 
shares of the merging parties exceeded a certain threshold.300
While not all of this antitrust jurisprudence has been expressly 
overruled, nearly all of it is dubious today. The per se rules against 
maximum and minimum resale price maintenance and the per se rule 
against vertical nonprice restraints have all been explicitly overruled.301
The boycott rule has been limited to situations that involve at least two 
competitors; That is, purely vertical boycotts are subject to the rule of 
reason.302 In other areas, such as antitrust treatment of joint ventures and 
                                                                                                                     
293. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); United States 
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357–58 (1967).
294. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People’s Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659–60
(1961) (discussing an agreement involving insurers refusing to approve plaintiff’s dangerous 
heater).
295. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 396 (1911), overruled 
by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
296. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
297. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 513 (1969) (Fortner I); N. Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 
U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
298. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372–73 (1967), overruled by
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
299. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
300. Id. at 362; see Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A
Decision-Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 271–74 (2015) (describing Philadelphia
Bank test as virtual per se rule). On the more qualified role that market structure should play in 
merger analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure,
and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming May 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046224.
301. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
302. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998) (purely vertical agreement to 
refuse to deal with third party must be evaluated under the rule of reason); see also Hannah’s 
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tying arrangements, the Supreme Court and lower courts have chipped 
away at the per se rule, although the basic decisions have not been 
expressly overruled.303 The strong structural presumption of merger 
illegality reflected in the Philadelphia Bank case has been very 
considerably diluted,304 although market structure remains relevant.305
B. Naked vs. Ancillary Restraints
Correct application of the per se rule depends critically on a judgment 
that certain practices are unreasonable as a “class,” or family group.306 As 
a result, condemnation requires that they be correctly placed within that 
group.307 Extensive study of certain classes of practices has shown, 
however, that many have alternative explanations that are competitively 
beneficial or benign.308 Most notable are resale price maintenance, tying 
arrangements, and horizontal restraints in joint ventures.309
1.  Mistaken Factual Judgments
Per se illegality is appropriate if judicial experience indicates that a 
particular class of restraints rarely has any effect but to reduce output and 
increase price.310 This is fundamentally an economic judgment. The 
judgment is also heavily factual, even though the ultimate choice of a rule 
presents a question of law.311 Because it is factual, it can also be wrong. 
For example, consider Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter’s widely 
quoted dicta in his opinion for the Court in the Standard Stations case 
that “important economic differences” exist between tying and exclusive 
dealing, revealing that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose 
beyond the suppression of competition.”312
                                                                                                                     
Boutique, Inc. v. Surdej, 112 F. Supp. 3d 758, 770 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (refusing to apply quick look 
to vertical-distribution restraint).
303. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 198 (2010) (examining joint 
ventures of competitors); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2006); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 
16 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 617–18 (1977) (examining tying). 
304. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
305. On the structural determinants of merger legality, see 4 & 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 1.




309. See infra notes 311–50 and accompanying text. 
310. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 1509 (class unreasonableness).
311. See supra notes 54–101 and accompanying text.
312. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
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Justice Frankfurter’s supposed factual observation was woefully 
mistaken. First of all, the principal case he relied on in making that 
judgment, International Salt Co. v. United States,313 involved tying by a 
nonmonopolist in the sale of salt-injecting equipment. Because the Court 
held that ownership of a patent was sufficient to establish power, it never 
determined International Salt’s market share in the market for salt-
injecting machines (the “Lixator” and the “Saltomat”).314 The tied 
product was salt, a common commodity incapable of being 
monopolized.315 The best estimates are that the defendant’s sales 
accounted for two to four percent of the salt market—not enough to 
foreclose anyone.316 The tie was very likely being used either to effect 
quality control317 or perhaps to engage in a form of price discrimination 
that is often beneficial to consumers as a class.318 Whatever the 
“suppression of competition” in International Salt was, Justice 
Frankfurter never identified it. Perhaps it was the fact that the tie removed 
many dollars’ worth of salt from the open market, but a simple contract 
to sell a large volume of salt would have done that.
Justice Frankfurter’s error serves as a warning to judges not to jump 
too quickly to categorical rules of law. The historical record on tying has 
always been mixed. Even by the time he wrote, some ties imposed by 
dominant firms very likely had unreasonably exclusionary effects.319
Others were almost certainly harmless or benign, however,320 while yet 
others had uncertain effects.321 Nothing about this history suggested that 
                                                                                                                     
313. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
314. Id. at 395–96.
315. Id.
316. See Victor P. Goldberg, The International Salt Puzzle, 14 J. RES. L. & ECON. 31, 36 
(1991) (estimating less than 2%); John L. Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22 J.L. & ECON.
351, 351 (1979) (estimating 4%).
317. For a revealing discussion of the facts and exploring the quality-control issue, see
Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam’s Razor: A Simple Explanation 
of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727, 786–90 (2004).
318. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 102, at 944.
319. E.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917) 
(addressing first-sale doctrine and incipient patent “misuse” theory).
320. E.g., Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 461 (1938) (discussing tying of 
patented process for making road services to an unpatentable emulsion of common petroleum 
products); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (discussing 
tying of dry ice, a common commodity incapable of being monopolized); United Shoe Mach. 
Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 456 (1922) (discussing full set of leased shoe-making 
machines).
321. IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135–36 (1936) (discussing tying of 
defendant’s data cards to leased computers); Pick Mfg. Co. v. GM Corp., 299 U.S. 3, 4 (1936) 
(holding GM’s insistence that dealers use of only original GM parts for automobile repair lawful); 
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tying arrangements “serve hardly any purpose” other than suppressing 
competition. At most it suggested that as of the 1940s tying arrangements 
were not yet well understood.
2.  Restraints Embedded in Legitimate Joint Activity
Joint ventures, trade associations, competitor-managed networks and 
other collaborative organizations usually contribute net social and 
economic benefits, but that does not necessarily mean that every 
agreement their members make is competitively harmless. A great deal 
of antitrust case law under the rule of reason has concerned specific 
agreements in the context of joint activities whose existence or general 
legitimacy was not being challenged.322 This has important implications 
for antitrust remedies.323 It also means that we need tools for identifying 
when these challenged restraints are legitimate or competitively harmful. 
The ancillary restraints doctrine addresses this need. It can exonerate 
agreements that facially appear to restrict output but that are also 
reasonably necessary to the venture’s effective functioning.324
The requirement that a restraint be “ancillary” to an organization’s 
legitimate activities applies only if the restraint itself threatens 
competition.325 If a particular agreement is competitively harmless, then 
it is lawful under the antitrust laws, whether or not it is ancillary. For 
example, suppose an organization such as the California Dental 
Association decides to require its executives to wear business suits with 
neckties to all organization functions. One might doubt that such a 
provision is reasonably necessary to the proper functioning of a 
professional association, but that is irrelevant unless we can come up with 
a credible reason for thinking that requiring suits and ties threatens 
competition.
One important contribution to rule of reason analysis was Robert 
Bork’s extended development of the ancillary restraints doctrine,326
which he attributed largely to then Sixth Circuit Judge Taft’s decision in 
the Addyston Pipe case.327 In fact, Bork read a great deal into Taft’s 
                                                                                                                     
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32 (1912) (discussing tying of defendant’s patent 
mimeograph machine to stencils, paper and ink, probably for metering purposes).
322. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 26–33 
(1978).
323. See infra notes 351–404 and accompanying text.
324. See BORK, supra note 322, at 28–30.
325. See id. at 27.
326. See id. at 26–33.
327. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278 (6th Cir. 1898). Taft 
later became Vice President and President of the United States, and after that Chief Justice of the 
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discussion, which concerned mainly why price fixing among 
unintegrated members of a cartel is unlawful per se, while “price fixing” 
among the members of a legally recognized entity such as a partnership 
is not.328 Taft pointed out that within the partnership the setting of a 
common price might be necessary, but it would be “ancillary” to the true 
business of the partnership.329 Bork later developed this distinction 
further when he was a judge on the D.C. Circuit.330
The ancillary restraints doctrine is not a comprehensive method for 
applying the rule of reason, but rather an early stage decision about which 
mode of analysis should be applied. First, it requires that the plaintiff 
identify a particular restraint, such as price fixing, output limitation, or 
concerted exclusion, that is allegedly causing competitive harm.331 The 
defendants then try to show that their collective business arrangement has 
a legitimate purpose, such as joint provision or other integration or 
networking, and that the challenged restraint is ancillary to that 
purpose.332 For example, once two large oil producers have developed a 
jointly owned refinery, the fungible gasoline that it produces must be sold 
to both participants’ dealers at the same price.333 By contrast, the ancillary 
restraints doctrine was never applied in the NCAA case because the 
defendants never made a convincing argument that the limitation on 
nationally televised games was reasonably necessary to the functioning 
of the venture.334 Rather, the defenses they offered indicated that the 
restraint was naked.335
                                                                                                                     
Supreme Court. See William Howard Taft, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/
presidents/williamhowardtaft (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). 
328. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 290–91.
329. Id. at 291 (citing Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 F. 36 (3d Cir. 1897); Am. Biscuit & 
Mfg. Co. v. Klotz, 44 F. 721 (E.D. La. 1891); Santa Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 
18 Pac. 391 (Cal. 1988); Pac. Factor Co. v. Adler, 27 P. 36 (Cal. 1891); Distilling & Cattle Feeding 
Co. v. People, 41 N.E. 188 (Ill. 1895); Richardson v. Buhl, 43 N.W. 1102 (Mich. 1889); State v. 
Neb. Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 155 (Neb. 1890); People v. Milk Exch., 39 N.E. 1062 (N.Y. 
1895); Pittsburgh Carbon Co. v. McMillin, 23 N.E. 530 (N.Y. 1890); Arnot v. Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 
558 (1877); People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 7 N.Y.S. 406 (1889); State v. Standard Oil Co., 
30 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1892)).
330. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224, 229–30
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
331. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
332. Id. at 7.
333. The Supreme Court considered the ancillary doctrine in Dagher. See Dagher, 547 U.S. 
at 5–7.
334. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 116–17 (1984).
335. See id. at 109–17 (1984); supra notes 155–61 and accompanying text.
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Once ancillarity has been invoked, the plaintiff can respond by 
showing that: (1) the claimed integrative activity is either untrue or a 
sham; (2) even if the claimed integrative activity is legitimate, the 
challenged restraint is not reasonably ancillary to it;336 or (3) although the
challenged activity might be reasonably ancillary to the venture’s overall 
activity, the anticompetitive effects are substantial and a less restrictive 
alternative is available.337
A restraint is “naked” if its profitability depends on the exercise of 
market power.338 Beginning with that definition, the best first thing is to 
make the defendant explain why the restraint is profitable. If it 
demonstrably improves product or performance, facilitates innovation or 
distribution, or otherwise pleases customers, then the restraint should be 
treated as ancillary. If its profitability depends on its ability to reduce 
output (measured by quantity or quality) and increase price, it is naked.339
Note that a restraint might do both of these things at the same time, but 
that simply makes it grist for rule of reason analysis. That is, the rule of 
reason applies where both set of effects are plausible and we have to sort 
out which one dominates. If the only impact of the restraint is to improve 
a product, then it is legal.
The Supreme Court’s Dagher decision added some confusion to the 
ancillary restraints doctrine by attempting to distinguish venture from 
extra-venture activities, and suggesting that the doctrine applied only to 
the latter.340 The Court approved a two-party joint-refining venture’s 
setting of a common price for its output, which was sold to dealers for 
both venture participants, Texaco and Shell.341 In the Court’s eyes, the 
setting of a price was a “venture activity,” and as a result must be regarded 
as lawful without resort to the ancillary restraints doctrine because the 
activity was effectively that of a single firm.342 That would of course 
suggest that the limitation on nationally televised games in the NCAA 
case was not a “venture activity,” because there the Court found a naked 
restraint of trade.343 However, an inherent part of the delivery of 
intercollegiate football over television is the negotiating of television 
                                                                                                                     
336. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 97–98.
337. See supra notes 177–203 and accompanying text.
338. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109–17.
339. See id. at 110.
340. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2006) (“We agree with petitioners that the 
ancillary restraints doctrine has no application here . . . .”).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 6.
343. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113–15 (1984).
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contracts, and a single entity would also have to decide how many games 
it wished to televise in behalf of each team.
A better way to view Dagher is as a joint venture that produced a 
fungible product, gasoline, to which each firm subsequently supplied its 
own distinctive additives. A common product coming out of a common 
refinery would have to be sold to the initial buyer at a single price, and 
there was no suggestion that the dealers, who were separate entities, were 
fixing prices in subsequent transactions.344 That made Dagher a classic 
ancillary restraints case.
To be sure, Judge Taft’s examples in Addyston Pipe, which Dagher
did not cite, did suggest a joint venture’s restrictions on nonventure 
activities as an example of an ancillary restraint. Thus, for example, a 
partnership might impose noncompetition agreements on its members, 
forbidding them from engaging in separate business in competition with 
the partnership.345 But such restrictions are only a small subset of the 
requirements that might be treated as ancillary, or not, to a joint venture.
The partnership might also promulgate a common pricing schedule for its 
partners, which would also be ancillary even though under Dagher it is 
clearly a venture activity.
In the context of joint ventures, a sensible starting definition of an 
ancillary restraint is one that is either arguably procompetitive on its own 
terms, or that is reasonably necessary to the proper functioning of the 
venture. As such, the restriction can be either on the venture’s own 
business (such as limits on the number of NCAA games), or else 
limitations on extra-venture business (such as rules limiting the ability of 
conference athletes to play non-conference games). By characterizing the 
restraint on the number of games in NCAA as naked,346 the Court was in 
fact saying two things: first, that there was little or no evidence that the 
NCAA joint venture really depended on this particular restraint for its 
success; second, this restraint was profitable because of its effect in 
cartelizing a market by reducing output.347
Rules that are nominally “output reducing” are frequently necessary 
to the proper functioning of a joint venture. For example, the NCAA must 
limit the number of conference games per team per season, the number 
of players who can be on a squad or on the field, or the number of minutes 
                                                                                                                     
344. See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 6–7.
345. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280–81 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(“Restrictions in the articles of partnership upon the business activity of the members, with a view 
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346. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110.
347. See id. at 104–07, 114.
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in a football game. A game with two hours of clock time, running perhaps 
six hours of real time rather than the current three, would create greater 
advertising opportunities. These rules are ancillary, however, because 
some limits must be set on the game itself. For example, limits must be 
set on the time of student athletes. This is also true of more traditional 
production joint ventures. Having decided to produce automobiles 
jointly, General Motors and Toyota must still settle on the number to 
produce and any number they choose could be assailed for not being 
larger.348
Price-affecting agreements promulgated by joint ventures or other 
legitimate associations have always been particularly difficult for courts. 
Often the key is fungibility of the product produced by the venture’s 
members. A price agreement is properly regarded as ancillary when the 
joint venture is involved in production of a fungible product.349 That was 
the case in Dagher, where the venture refinery produced gasoline.350 It 
was also true for the coal-selling joint-selling agency involved in 
Appalachian Coals.351 A common dealer representing several dozen coal 
mining companies would sell coal as a unitary product, perhaps without 
even identifying the particular mine from which the coal came.352 While 
the price at any moment would depend on market conditions, it could not 
depend on which member’s coal was being sold.353 If it did, then the low-
price seller would sell all of its coal first, the second lowest next, and so 
on.
By contrast, when products are differentiated, individual pricing 
might be consistent with the operation of the venture. For example, 
several manufacturers of automobiles may build a common testing or 
R&D facility, or perhaps even a production facility for certain 
components. But once each has produced its own, differentiated 
automobiles, there is no obvious reason that they would have to fix their 
prices. So in some cases shared production of inputs requires the setting 
of a joint price but in others it does not. In addition, fixing downstream 
prices two or more transactions removed from the venture is more 
                                                                                                                     
348. See Carl Shapiro & Robert D. Willig, On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint 
Ventures, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 117–18 (1990).
349. See, e.g., Dagher, 547 U.S. at 8; Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 
376–77 (1933).
350. Dagher, 547 U.S. at 8.
351. See 288 U.S. at 377.
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suspicious. For example, the Dagher joint venture’s setting of a common 
price for fungible gasoline made perfect sense for the initial transaction 
from the venture to the dealers. But the dealers themselves are separate 
entities and, absent some good argument to the contrary, competition 
should determine their downstream markups and prices.
C. Remedies
The antitrust equity statutes are very broad, giving the government 
authority to “prevent and restrain” antitrust violations354 and authorizing 
private parties to obtain an injunction against “threatened loss or damage” 
from an antitrust violation.355 One important difference between these 
two provisions is that equitable relief for private parties is limited to those 
antitrust violations that actually threaten to injure the private plaintiffs 
themselves,356 while the government has a more global enforcement 
authority to restrain violations without showing injury to itself.357
In both cases, however, the power to obtain equity relief from a court 
is limited to violations of the antitrust laws. The statutes do not authorize 
mandatory dissolution of a complex entity or combination simply 
because some small facet encompasses an antitrust violation.358 Statutory 
language aside, an efficient enforcement rule should to the extent possible 
leave the socially valuable provisions of a joint venture intact, at least in 
cases where these can safely be segregated from the competitively 
harmful provisions. So, when the restraint is part of a more elaborate joint 
venture, a properly designed remedy should enable the venture to 
function and preserve all or most of its socially valuable activity, while 
limiting or eliminating the harmful activity. 
1.  Delimiting Remedies Against Complex Activity
The power to devise and limit remedies judicially has evolved 
considerably over the history of antitrust. For example, the first case that 
the United States Supreme Court decided on the merits involved a joint 
                                                                                                                     
354. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2012).
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venture that was very likely efficient but that also fixed railroad-freight 
rates, perhaps anticompetitively.359 As both the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the Eighth Circuit observed, the principal purpose of the 
joint venture was to facilitate long-distance shipment when most of the 
railroads operated within a single state.360 Interstate shipments had to be 
transferred from one line to the next and this necessitated agreements on 
such things as scheduling, cargo transfer, track gauges, and perhaps even 
freight rates.361 In the 1890s, agents computed freight rates manually with 
pencil and paper. If a package had to be shipped down multiple roads, the
agent at the beginning would have to calculate a rate for the entire trip. 
As a result, both the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Eighth 
Circuit agreed that the railroads needed a “common authority” to set rates 
and facilitate inter-railroad transfers and scheduling.362 Nevertheless, the 
government requested a complete dissolution of the venture, and the 
Supreme Court complied.363 This meant, of course, that all the benefits 
of the venture were lost together with any anticompetitive effects.
Moving forward nearly a century, the Supreme Court’s NCAA
decision is in sharp contrast.364 At issue was an NCAA rule limiting the 
number of nationally televised football games that any team could offer 
in one year.365 All parties and the Court conceded that the NCAA overall
was essential to the operation of intercollegiate sports, and also that this 
required a great deal of coordinated rule making.366 Indeed, the plaintiff 
University of Oklahoma was an NCAA member with a highly successful 
football team.367 It hardly wanted the NCAA dissolved. Rather, it 
attacked a single provision limiting the number of nationally televised 
                                                                                                                     
359. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 341 (1897). On the 
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games per team.368 The requested remedy was a narrow injunction against 
enforcement of the four-game limitation.369 The more recent 
O’Bannon370 case is similar. No one sought dissolution of the NCAA. 
Rather, the plaintiffs wanted to forcibly modify rules regarding NCAA 
athletes’ compensation, and to force schools to share with athletes a 
portion of the revenue from licensing those students’ names and 
likenesses.371
The narrowing of equitable remedies in such cases is based on the 
premise that the venture as a whole is socially valuable and worth
keeping.372 Before granting such a remedy the court must also determine 
whether the challenged provision appears to affect price or output and, if 
so, whether it is reasonably “ancillary” to the functioning of the 
venture.373 The NCAA Court found that the restriction was not 
necessary,374 and expressed this by calling the challenged restraint 
“naked”—that is, a naked restraint contained in an otherwise beneficial 
joint venture.
As noted previously, many of the antitrust cases in which the FTC or 
a lower court has accepted “quick look” analysis involve restraints 
attached to other conduct that is either concededly or arguably 
procompetitive.375 The court must identify those aspects of the 
defendants’ conduct that are anticompetitive and attempt to sever those 
agreements from the venture as a whole.376
In such cases, should the remedy be an injunction, damages, or both? 
As a general matter, in cases where transaction costs are relatively low an 
injunction rule is preferable because the parties can bargain around it to 
an efficient result.377 By contrast, if transaction costs are high, then 
damages are preferable, assuming that the court has a rational basis for 
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computing them.378 Whether this approach is appropriate in antitrust
cases is an interesting question.379 Competition injuries typically affect 
many interests who are not parties in the antitrust litigation. For example, 
in NCAA the rationale for antitrust condemnation was an output reduction 
and consumer injury in the market for televised football.380 But the case 
itself was an internecine dispute limited to members of the NCAA 
organization.381 No party even purported to speak for consumers.382
Nevertheless, optimal damages in such a case must be large enough 
to compensate all injured parties, including consumers.383 Optimal 
damages for a joint venture antitrust case equals the amount of any 
monopoly overcharge plus the deadweight loss.384 If the conduct is 
efficient, then the defendant’s gains will cover both the overcharge and 
deadweight loss and have something left over, but not otherwise.385
Computing these numbers is extraordinarily difficult, suggesting an 
administrative preference for an injunction.386
Further, mandatory trebling strengthens the case for an injunction-
only remedy. Trebling distorts the efficiency calculus very considerably. 
For example, suppose the harm caused by the defendants’ practice is 
$1,000 per year (deadweight loss plus overcharge) and yields the 
defendants $1,200 in profits per year. A simple damages rule would 
permit the conduct to continue because the defendants could pay them 
and still make a $200 profit. In a well-functioning market, the parties 
would bargain around an anticipated injunction and the defendant would 
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pay some amount between $1,000 and $1,200 and continue the practice. 
Both of these outcomes are efficient. But with mandatory trebling, the 
value of the damages goes to $3,000. The defendant will very likely halt 
the practice, even if it is efficient.387
Taking existing law as given, treble damages and all, it appears that 
the optimal approach would be to permit an injunction that is narrowly 
tailored to suppress the competition-injuring behavior, but not more, 
along with damages to injured parties for past harm done.
2.  Equitable Remedies: Unilateral vs. Collaborative Conduct
Collaborative conduct is inherently more conducive to tailored 
equitable remedies than is unilateral conduct. This makes it critical to 
distinguish the two types of conduct, an issue that is more complex than 
appears on first glance. As a general proposition, courts treat 
organizations whose owners are multiple shareholders or whose assets 
are multiple incorporated subsidiaries as single entities unreachable by 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.388 By contrast, actors who are joined together by 
contract and whose individual members retain significant business 
decision-making power are treated as individuals and § 1 applies.389
Firms might take advantage of the legal system in order to disguise 
their activities or structure, making multilateral agreements appear to be 
unilateral. For example, the members of a joint venture might become 
shareholders in a common corporation that directs portions of their 
business, but this does not change the fact that they are independent 
profit-maximizing entities. The Supreme Court recognized this nearly 
fifty years ago in the Sealy390 and Topco cases, both of which applied § 1
of the Sherman Act to incorporated joint ventures whose members were 
also their shareholders.391 This also happened in the case of network-
charge-card entities Visa and Mastercard, who incorporated as single 
entities even as they carried out policies made by their shareholder 
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members, who were competing banks.392 It was also true of the Supreme 
Court’s American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League393 decision, 
where a single corporation operated as exclusive licensee of all of the 
NFL teams’ separately owned intellectual property rights and then 
licensed them out exclusively.394 Corporate status did not serve to change 
this agreement from collaborative to unilateral as long as it was guided 
by or affected the individual business decisions of the teams.395
Importantly, this result does not necessarily make the conduct unlawful, 
but rather serves to make it amenable to the more aggressive standards of 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.396
The remedial consequence of treatment as a single entity rather than 
an agreement of multiple entities is readily apparent. The optimal penalty 
against unilateral conduct is a fine or damages rather than an 
injunction.397 For multilateral conduct, however, the case for an 
injunction is far stronger.398
For both types of conduct, the trick is to devise an injunction that does 
not require ongoing regulation of the defendant’s business. For example, 
in an anticompetitive exclusion case involving a single entity, an 
injunction would have to specify the scope and terms of the defendant’s 
duty to deal, effectively placing the court in the role of public utility 
regulator. This fact has played a particularly powerful role in the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance either to recognize an “essential facility” doctrine or 
else to expand the monopolist’s unilateral duty to deal with rivals.399
These problems typically do not arise when the challenged action is 
that of a collaborative venture. In that case the venture’s members are 
individual maximizers. The court can simply enjoin the practice found to 
be unlawful, and individual venture members can then compete to the 
competitive outcome. Using the NCAA case as an example, if the NCAA 
were a single entity and a court found the four-national-televised-game-
per-season rule to be anticompetitive, then it would have to devise and 
supervise an optimal remedy, requiring ongoing supervision of the 
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NCAA’s internal affairs. But given that the NCAA was a joint venture 
whose members were individual profit maximizers, a simple injunction 
against enforcement of the four-game rule would likely suffice. Free from 
this constraint, each team could then negotiate for as many national 
television events as the market would bear. More popular teams would 
obtain more contracts to be sure, but that is the way competition works.
An example that speaks to the issue is the Supreme Court’s American 
Needle decision.400 The NFL required all member teams to grant an 
exclusive license to individual team trademark and related rights to a
central organization, NFL Properties, which then gave an exclusive 
license to a single firm to manufacture logoed headgear for retail sale.401
The defense, recognized by the Seventh Circuit but reversed by the 
Supreme Court, was that the NFL was a single entity subject only to § 2
of the Sherman Act.402
Under the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, the case involved nothing more 
than an internal dispute about how a multi-divisional single entity would 
allocate intellectual property rights among its subsidiaries.403 For 
example, a decision by Ford Motor Company to refuse to license out the 
name “Lincoln,” referring to one of Ford’s wholly owned subsidiaries, 
would be a unilateral act. United States antitrust law almost never 
compels a firm acting unilaterally to license its intellectual property 
rights.404 If it did, a court would have to determine the scope and terms 
of the duty to deal.
By contrast, if the NFL were a multi-actor joint venture, as the 
Supreme Court concluded, a simple injunction against enforcement of the 
exclusive licensing provision would be preferable on both substantive 
and enforcement grounds. As for the substance, while unilateral refusals 
to license are virtually immune from antitrust challenge, concerted 
refusals are not.405 As for enforcement concerns, an injunction would 
simply free up each NFL member team to make its own decision about 
the maximizing way to license its IP right. Further, if they colluded, § 1
of the Sherman Act could be brought to bear.
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D. Naked Restraints Embedded in Legitimate Joint Ventures; 
Inherent Rule of Reason?
As the NCAA case makes clear, even socially beneficial joint ventures 
may embody naked restraints.406 In this setting a restraint is naked if it 
makes no contribution to the proper functioning of the joint venture and
is profitable only because of its tendency to reduce output and raise 
price.407 The first of these elements suggests why a hard-core per se rule 
might not be in order: The tribunal needs to determine the relationship 
between the restraint and the overall venture.408 Once it has determined 
that a restraint is not essential to the venture’s legitimate functioning and 
that its profitability depends on power over price, then there is no reason 
for the court to delay. It can condemn the restraint without inquiring into 
power.
All of this would be straightforward enough were it not for NCAA’s
one additional holding—that the rule of reason must be applied to all 
restraints when a joint venture is essential to producing the product at 
all.409 Applying this rule of reason, the Court then held that the particular 
restraint before the Court was not necessary to delivery of the product.410
That made the output-affecting restraint at issue naked, but it had to be 
condemned under the rule of reason anyway.
The Court did not attempt to justify the link between situations where 
joint activity is essential to operations and global use of the rule of reason, 
which seems inconsistent with the established ancillary restraints 
doctrine. A network industry such as the cellular phone system may need 
standards and cross-licensing in order to be able to deliver its product, but 
that hardly serves to explain why its members would need an agreement 
to fix smartphone prices. Or suppose an NCAA restraint fixes the prices 
of stadium hot dogs or parking?
Viewed more narrowly, however, the Court’s language may have 
meant only that because the venture itself was not being challenged, at 
least a brief second look must be given to those restraints incorporated 
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into the joint venture agreement—for no other reason than to ensure that 
they are reasonably necessary to the functioning of the venture. That brief 
look would be enough to ensure that the “rule of reason” is being applied, 
even though condemnation might be appropriate on a very truncated 
analysis once the restraint was found to be inessential and naked.
E. Agreements Concerning Intellectual Property Rights
How should antitrust tribunals treat the fact that collaborative activity 
includes agreements concerning intellectual property rights? Factually, 
technology transfers and joint research and development are essential 
elements of innovation and technological progress. At the same time, 
however, agreements that nominally license IP rights, particularly 
patents, can be just as anticompetitive as agreements involving 
unprotected products.411
One important set of tools for approaching this problem is the 
language of the intellectual property statutes themselves. To the extent 
that the IP statutes expressly authorize a particular practice, it should be 
immune from antitrust attack. For example, the Patent Act provides that 
a unilateral refusal to license cannot be either patent misuse or an antitrust 
violation,412 or that tying of patented goods is unlawful only in the 
presence of tying-market power.413 The mere fact that the Patent Act 
authorizes certain conduct does not entail that it authorizes particular 
anticompetitive instances of that conduct. For example, while the Patent 
Act authorizes the transfer of patents,414 this does not mean that they can 
be sold anticompetitively. Thus an acquisition of patents can still be an 
unlawful asset acquisition for purposes of the merger laws.415 Congress 
changes the Patent Act frequently, and can always create or resize an 
immunity if it sees fit.416
When the Patent Act does not authorize a certain practice, the best 
approach is to let antitrust do what it ordinarily does, condemning naked 
agreements under a per se rule and applying the rule of reason to 
legitimately ancillary activity. Of course, the fact that a challenged 
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restraint is part of an intellectual-property licensing scheme can certainly 
be relevant to questions about ancillarity. Most technology-transfer 
agreements contemplate joint research or joint production, making them 
grist for ancillary restraints doctrine and the rule of reason. By contrast, 
product price fixing is usually a naked restraint, particularly if the 
products were separately developed.
The same thing is true of pay-for-delay settlements such as the one at 
issue in Actavis.417 During the period covered by the agreement—that is, 
until licensed production actually occurs—there is typically no integrated 
productive activity to which such an agreement is reasonably ancillary. 
That makes it a form of naked product-market division. In addition, a 
payment that delays entry to some point later than the expiration of the 
patent should be unlawful per se. During the post-expiration period such 
an agreement is a naked restraint unprotected by any language in the 
Patent Act.418 A delayed entry payment that permits entry prior to the 
patent’s expiry raises different issues and requires more elaborate 
treatment, as the Supreme Court’s Actavis majority developed.419
Nominally, the Court’s decision required the rule of reason, but it also 
permitted both power and anticompetitive effects to be inferred upon 
seriously truncated proof.420 Clearly, an agreement that delays generic 
production into the future and effectively prohibits other firms from 
coming in is a naked restraint, profitable only because it reduces output 
during the exclusion period.
All purely vertical intellectual-property agreements should be 
assessed under the rule of reason, consistent with the evaluation of 
vertical agreements generally.421 Such agreements involve a rights holder 
as licensor who is not in competition with any licensee. Pools and other 
forms of technology sharing should presumptively be assessed under the 
rule of reason, but with some warnings. One is when they purport to 
control products rather than IP rights. Another is when they are exclusive, 
particularly when the patents in question were separately developed. By 
contrast, joint development ventures may require exclusivity in order to 
                                                                                                                     
417. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013).
418. EU law condemns such agreements “by object,” which is roughly equivalent to the per 
se rule. See Case T-472/13, Lundbeck v. Commission, 2016 E.C.R. 613TJ0472 (condemning pay-
for-delay agreements, at least one of which extended beyond the expiration of the relevant patent).
419. See generally 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (discussing delayed-entry payments).
420. See Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS L.
REV. 585, 590 (2015).
421. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
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create sufficient incentives and control free rider problems. In any event, 
exclusivity is generally harmless in the absence of power.
IV. APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON: STRUCTURAL ISSUES
Under the rule of reason, the plaintiff must show that the defendants 
have market power,422 which generally refers to the power held by the 
organization as a collective. For example, if traditional market share 
measurements are used, the relevant share is usually the sum of the shares 
of the individual members of a joint venture or other organization whose 
conduct is in issue.423
The brief discussion below does not attempt to recount all of the 
technical issues involved in assessing market power under the antitrust 
laws.424 Rather, it defends two propositions. First, for most horizontal 
collaborations assessed under the rule of reason, the market-power 
requirement should be less than it is for a single dominant firm engaged 
in similar activity. Relatedly, alternative measures that do not depend on 
computation of a market share may be more appropriate in the context of 
a joint venture. Second, however, and in some conflict with existing law, 
for purely vertical agreements involving the threat of exclusion (mainly 
exclusive dealing and tying), the power requirement should be closer to 
the requirement for single-firm monopolization.
A. Assessing the Power of Horizontal Collaborators
The formation of a joint venture of competitors or potential 
competitors creates power by agreement, often in an instant. For example, 
if three firms each having 25% of the market should form a joint-
production venture, their aggregate output will immediately be 75%.425 If 
an open-membership venture such as a real-estate multiple-listing 
organization is attractive to new firms because it promises high profits, 
new entrants will have an incentive to join. In sum, joint venture power 
is typically created by fusion, and much more easily and quickly than by 
unilateral conduct. While the relationship between the monopolist and its 
                                                                                                                     
422. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
423. 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 574.
424. See generally id. at ch. 5 (explaining how to identify the presence and boundaries of 
market power within a given market).
425. If the venture results in an anticompetitive price increase, market share could fall below 
this number, as some buyers respond to the higher price by substituting away. If the venture 
produces cost reductions or a superior product, its share could rise as its output becomes more 
attractive.
2018] THE RULE OF REASON 155
rivals is inherently hostile, the relationship between an open-membership 
venture and other firms may be much more inviting.
In addition, nonstructural remedies are typically easier to administer 
against a joint venture.426 For example, the remedy in a case such as 
NCAA is simply an injunction against the four-game limitation on 
nationally televised productions.427 Each team is then free to choose the 
number of games it wishes to televise. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision, the number of nationally televised football games increased
dramatically.428 If the NCAA were a single entity, however, then 
administering relief would require a regulator to determine the optimal 
number of games that each firm could televise nationally. The relative 
non-invasiveness of antitrust remedies against complex but 
procompetitive joint ventures suggests that over-deterrence is a smaller 
problem than for unilateral conduct.
The rule of reason for both unilateral and collaborative activity 
requires proof of market power sufficient to warrant the inference that the 
challenged conduct is anticompetitive.429 The requisite minimum 
depends on the type of activity that is being challenged.430 For example, 
unilateral predatory pricing is generally thought to be a successful 
exclusionary strategy only if the predator already has a dominant position 
in the market.431 There is little reason to deviate from that premise when 
the defendant is a collaboration rather than a single entity. By contrast, 
filing a patent-infringement suit on an improperly obtained patent432
could, if successful, enable a firm with a relatively modest market share 
to acquire a significant monopoly.433
Reflecting these considerations, under current antitrust doctrine 
single-firm exclusionary practices bear the highest market power 
requirement, depending on whether the challenged offense is 
                                                                                                                     
426. See supra notes 394–402 and accompanying text.
427. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984); see supra notes 394–402 and 
accompanying text.
428. Ira Horowitz, The Reasonableness of Horizontal Restraints: NCAA (1984) 215–16, in
THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION (Lawrence J. White & John Kwoka eds., 1999).
429. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 728.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. E.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 
(1965).
433. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 148, at 1407. Kaplow would vary the market-power requirement 
with conduct as well, but more elaborately than suggested here.
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monopolization or attempt to monopolize.434 Generalizing about 
horizontal joint ventures is more difficult and variations are much wider 
than for unilateral conduct, but the minimum stated in the case law is 
clearly less than for unilateral exclusionary practices.435
B. Power Requirements for Vertical Exclusionary Conduct
One important difference between horizontal and vertical restraints is 
that the former can create power merely by the agreement itself. For 
example, the contractual union of seven firms with 10% market shares 
each can create a joint arrangement with a market share of 70%. By 
contrast, a purely vertical agreement does nothing to increase market 
shares. Of course, the large market share may already be there, but the 
vertical agreement itself does not add to it. As a result, purely vertical 
agreements require an additional explanation of how harm to competition 
comes about. This fact makes vertical agreements presumptively less 
offensive to competition than horizontal restraints. For example, if seven 
10% firms joined in a joint distribution arrangement, we might 
legitimately require a further explanation why the arrangement, which 
now controls 70% of distribution, is reasonable under the circumstances. 
                                                                                                                     
434. See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 807c–e (collecting decisions and 
observing considerable variation in market share requirements).
435. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2003) (displaying 
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Supp. 535, 541 (D. Del. 1997) (hospital and home-health-care-provider joint venture, “a market 
share of less than 55 [percent], without other evidence tending to show monopoly power, is 
insufficient as a matter of law”); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Giles Mem’l Hosp., 846 
F. Supp. 488, 493–94 (W.D. Va. 1994) (“Numerous cases and commentators have suggested that
absent extraordinary circumstances, a market share over fifty percent is required to show market 
power” and that the joint venture’s market share “peak[ed] at 44.1[%] in 1989 and average[d] 
32.9[%] over the 1986–1989 period of its existence. Thus, defendants’ market share was 
significantly below the established floor for showing monopoly power”).
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By contrast, when a single firm with a 70% market share engages in 
restricted distribution we would not ordinarily require an explanation on 
that basis alone. There would have to be some additional element, such 
as upstream exclusion or downstream foreclosure, or perhaps facilitation 
of collusion.
Vertical interbrand restraints, which include tying and exclusive 
dealing, are more closely akin to exclusionary practices by dominant 
firms than to joint ventures.436 Indeed, many of the things challenged as 
monopolistic practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act are actually a 
form of tying, exclusive dealing, or related practice.437 When a classic tie 
or exclusive deal raises anticompetitive concerns, it is because a single 
upstream firm is using the arrangement as an exclusionary practice 
directed at rivals in its own market.438 The entities upon which the tie or 
exclusive deal is imposed are simply conduits.439 For example, by forcing 
computer makers or customers to accept the Internet Explorer browser as 
a condition of obtaining Windows, Microsoft was attempting to exclude 
Netscape, a rival in the browser market.440
One significant difference between intrabrand and interbrand 
restraints is that established dealers typically profit from intrabrand 
restraints such as resale price maintenance or location clauses.441 The 
dealers who are most generally affected tend to be newcomers and 
discounters.442 As a result, practices such as resale price maintenance are 
often collaborative, in the sense that both manufacturer and established 
dealers profit from them. Indeed, the original Dr. Miles RPM case 
involved a druggists’ cartel using their supplier, Dr. Miles, to impose 
resale price maintenance in order to discipline discounters.443 Even the 
“classical” defenses of RPM, such as free riding, involve a set of 
                                                                                                                     
436. See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 767–69, 776–77 (4th ed. 2015) 
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437. E.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing 
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441. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 1604.
442. Id.
443. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 340–47 
(1991) (showing that the cartel of retail druggists forced Dr. Miles to impose RPM on its products 
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established dealers who have agreed to provide a full set of supplier-
mandated services, and a set of less established discounters who seek to 
avoid them.444 The one vertical interbrand restraint that is likely to 
encounter significant opposition from established dealers is maximum 
resale price maintenance, because it limits dealers’ ability to take full 
advantage of their pricing power in their sales areas.445 But this is so 
because maximum RPM is virtually always procompetitive.446 Indeed, it 
is difficult even to articulate a coherent anticompetitive explanation for it 
other than the possibility that it might be disguised minimum price 
fixing.447
By contrast, dealers are more likely to resist tying or exclusive 
dealing, which limit their own freedom.448 To be sure, there are 
exceptions to both of these rules, but they do prevail in most cases. As a 
result, tying and exclusive dealing do not represent an “aggregative” use 
of power in the way that a cartel or joint venture does.449 Tying and 
exclusive dealing are both unlawful when they exclude rivals 
unreasonably, principally rivals in the downstream or tied-product 
market.450 When they have this effect, the practice typically injures not 
only consumers and rivals, but also the dealers or other intermediaries 
upon whom the restraint is imposed.451 For example, the claim in United 
States v. Dentsply International, Inc.,452 a Section 2 case, was that 
Dentsply’s exclusive-dealing rule denied dentists lower cost alternative 
teeth materials that the market would otherwise have made available.453
That practice injured Dentsply’s rivals, its own dealers, and consumers.454
The tying claim in Microsoft455 was that the Windows/Internet Explorer 
tie denied market access to rival browsers such as Netscape, a product 
                                                                                                                     
444. E.g., Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON.
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variation that presumably would have made computer sellers as well as 
consumers better off.456
To be sure, many tying arrangements are efficient, benefitting 
consumers and presumably also dealers by increasing output, improving 
product quality, or simplifying distribution.457 But the important point is 
that when tying is anticompetitive, competitors, dealers, and customers 
can all be expected to resist it. As a result, a firm imposing a tie is “on its 
own,” so to speak, and it makes little sense to aggregate its shares or 
assess a lighter burden on the power issue. When ties or exclusive deals 
are legitimately exclusionary they are so on more-or-less the same 
conditions as the general run of unilaterally-imposed exclusionary 
practices.458 As a result, Sherman Act Section 2 monopoly-power 
standards should apply to them.
C. Vertical Agreements and the Rule of Reason
The classic joint venture is made up of competitors or potential 
competitors, and the threat posed by the venture is that it can diminish 
competition between them, either by facilitating price fixing or excluding 
certain rivals.459 Many of these ventures additionally contain vertical 
elements to the extent that some important asset is being bought and sold. 
For example, NFL teams may negotiate exclusive contracts to license 
their IP rights to a common broker,460 or the members of a patent pool or 
blanket license arrangement may license their rights to one another or to 
a common holder.461
The rule of reason for vertical restraints addresses the same set of 
issues as for horizontal restraints, with one important qualifier: While 
agreements among competitors are relatively exceptional and require 
some scrutiny, ordinary buy–sell and licensing agreements are an 
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essential part of ordinary business, right down to the consumer level.462
As a result, simply alleging a vertical agreement gets a plaintiff 
nowhere.463 Vertical restraints should be found unlawful only when they 
facilitate an output reduction that serves to increase prices in relation to 
costs. To that extent, every anticompetitive vertical restrain must contain 
at least an implicit horizontal element, whether it be collusion or 
exclusion. The vast majority of purely vertical agreements pose no such 
threat. These conclusions are largely borne out by the case law. Once the 
rule of reason is applied to a vertical practice, few instances of it are 
condemned.464 The exceptions tend to be for exclusive dealing or quasi-
exclusion dealing, but that is precisely because the threat posed by these 
practices relates to horizontal exclusion.465
When considering vertical restrains and a possible per se rule, the first 
question is whether one can even conceive of a purely vertical agreement 
that is “naked” in the sense that its only likely effects are anticompetitive.
Even assuming the answer is yes, would such agreements exist in 
sufficient numbers to warrant categorical treatment?
After years of ambiguity, the Supreme Court finally stated a strong 
and categorical rule that purely vertical agreements should be assessed 
under the rule of reason.466 Previously, however, it had believed 
otherwise.467 Minimum resale price maintenance was unlawful per se 
from the Supreme Court’s 1911 Dr. Miles decision468 to its 2007 Leegin
decision, when the Supreme Court overruled nearly a century of authority 
and applied the rule of reason.469 Maximum RPM’s per se rule had a 
shorter life. Manufacturer setting of a dealer’s maximum price first 
became unlawful per se in the Supreme Court’s Albrecht v. Herald Co.470
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decision in 1968,471 until Albrecht was overruled by State Oil Co. v. 
Khan472 in 1997. Since Khan Oil, no decisions have condemned 
maximum RPM.473
Vertical nonprice restraints generally involve such things as 
assignment of dealer locations or territories and rules forbidding these 
dealers from making sales outside their appointed area.474 They can also 
involve dealer-warranty-service requirements, showroom requirements, 
prohibitions on the sale of used goods, or even restrictions on how the 
dealer’s business holds itself open to customers.475 Vertical nonprice 
restraints have been addressed under the rule of reason for most of the 
life of the antitrust laws. However, in the single decade between 1967 and 
1977, the Supreme Court applied the per se rule to these restrictions.
The Court’s meandering journey on vertical nonprice restraints is a 
stage play for the Court’s uncertainty about antitrust treatment of vertical 
agreements generally. In the government-brought White Motor case in 
1963, the Court refused to decide the issue of per se illegality for vertical 
territorial restraints, concluding that it was too early to identify their
principal purpose or effects.476 In the 1966 Schwinn case, just four years 
later, the Court believed it knew enough, declaring dealer locational 
restrictions unlawful per se for a firm that had less than 13% of the 
market.477 The Court concluded that “it is unreasonable without more for 
a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom 
an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion 
over it.”478 The Court confusingly mixed common law concerns about 
restraints on alienation with competition policy. Only a decade later, 
however, it overruled Schwinn in GTE Sylvania.479 The Court suggested 
that while vertical locational restrictions might restrain “intrabrand” 
competition—that is, among dealers in the same brand—they can
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promote “interbrand” competition with dealers in other brands.480
Balancing these effects required rule of reason treatment.481 Vertical 
nonprice restraints have been evaluated under a rule of reason ever since, 
and few instances have been condemned.482
Interbrand restraints, including exclusive dealing and tying, have also 
experienced doctrinal inconsistency. Under tying, a buyer is permitted to 
purchase one product only if it agrees to take a second product from the 
same seller as well. Exclusive dealing prohibits sellers from dealing in a
competitor’s goods. For example, a Ford automobile dealership’s 
franchise agreement might prohibit it from selling new cars other than 
Fords. 
A per se rule may still survive for some tying arrangements, provided 
that the defendant has sufficient tying-market power to force a choice that 
the purchaser does not want.483 In Illinois Tool Works, the Supreme Court 
somewhat confusingly declared that it was eliminating a per se rule that 
a tie was unlawful simply because the defendant’s tying product was 
patented.484 However, it also embraced the Court’s holding in Jefferson 
Parish, which clearly had not overruled per se precedents but simply 
declared that the defendant’s market share was too small to give it the 
power to force a buyer to make a choice that it would not otherwise have 
made.485 Indeed, Jefferson Parish declared that “if the existence of 
forcing is probable,” then “per se prohibition is appropriate.”486 The case 
involved a tying product that was not patented. Presuming that the Illinois 
Tool Works Court intended to overrule precedent on the narrowest 
possible grounds, the best interpretation is that it was overruling any per 
se presumption based simply on the fact that the tying product was 
patented.487 Indeed, later in the Court’s opinion, Supreme Court Justice 
John Paul Stevens spoke of the need to reexamine “the presumption of 
per se illegality of a tying arrangement involving a patented product.”488
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Instead, invocation of the per se rule against tying requires proof of tying-
market power as traditionally defined.489
To be sure, tying in the presence of power and sufficient foreclosure 
can exclude rivals. Whether it does so anticompetitively is a question for 
the rule of reason, because tying can also reduce costs, improve product 
quality, or facilitate price discrimination, much of which is competitively 
harmless.490 Nearly everyone agrees that the so-called “leverage” theory 
for non-foreclosing ties is defunct.491
Exclusive dealing has always been recognized as a rule of reason 
offense.492 As noted previously, however, sometimes its foreclosure 
effects can reach more broadly than tying does.493 A tie applies to a tying 
product, while exclusive dealing applies to an entire store or 
dealership.494 Exclusive dealing can even compel the same type of 
second-degree price discrimination that tying does. For example, an ice-
cream franchisor that requires franchisees to sell its products exclusively 
might build an overcharge into the products and use it in lieu of a volume-
based franchise fee. In an attempt to take advantage of the harsher rule 
against tying, some plaintiffs have attempted to characterize such 
arrangements as ties, in which the tying product was the franchise or 
business name, and the tied product was the product or products made 
subject to the exclusive deal.495 Of course, to the extent that is true, all 
exclusive dealing could be turned into ties simply by characterizing the 
sales contract, a licensed trademark, or some other common incident of 
business as the tying product. In general, however, there is no categorical 
reason why ties should be treated more harshly than exclusive dealing. 
All should be treated under the rule of reason, and because they are 
fundamentally exclusionary practices that drive rivals out rather than 
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pulling them in, they should be subject to monopolization law’s market-
power requirements.496
D. Compound Vertical–Horizontal Practices
The best approach to purely vertical restraints is a categorical rule of 
reason. Setting tying aside, the only other recognized legal exception 
concerns dealer cartels, which means that these restraints are not purely 
vertical at all. A powerful dealer in a certain market may insist on either 
maintained prices or vertical dispersion in order to reduce competition 
from other dealers, thus permitting a unilateral price increase.497 As 
established by the Dr. Miles litigation, a subset of colluding dealers can 
do the same thing.498 In both of these situations, the success of the 
strategy depends on the power held by downstream firms and the strength 
of the manufacturer’s brand vis-à-vis alternatives. The dealer-cartel 
situation is an easy one; if it is naked, it should be illegal per se.499 Of 
course, not every joint-dealer complaint about a price cutter is necessarily 
anticompetitive, because the offending dealer may be ignoring other 
legitimate, costly requirements that the manufacturer has imposed. As a 
result, the court needs to determine whether dealer collusion or the 
manufacturer’s wishes to promote distribution efficiency accounts for the 
restraint.
In his opinion in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,500 Justice Breyer 
painstakingly distinguished the Supreme Court’s much earlier Klor’s
decision on concerted refusals to deal.501 The Court concluded that the 
circumstances in NYNEX, which involved an agreement between a single 
upstream firm and a single downstream firm, must be subject to the rule 
of reason.502 By contrast, Klor’s involved allegations that its rival retailer 
Broadway-Hale conspired with several otherwise competing appliance 
manufacturers to boycott Klors.503
In Leegin, the Court added a wrinkle, speaking of a dealer that accedes 
to the wishes of a manufacturer’s cartel, or inversely, a manufacturer that 
                                                                                                                     
496. See supra notes 447–53 and accompanying text. 
497. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶1604.
498. E.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 229 (3d Cir. 
2008) (refusing to dismiss RPA claim alleging that it was instigated by a dealers’ cartel). On the 
Dr. Miles retail druggists’ cartel, see supra note 443.
499. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007) (stating 
in dicta that such a dealer cartel would be per se unlawful).
500. 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
501. Id. at 135–36. 
502. Id. at 131.
503. Id. at 135.
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accedes to a dealer’s cartel:
A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or 
competing retailers that decreases output or reduces 
competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, per 
se unlawful. To the extent a vertical agreement setting 
minimum resale prices is entered upon to facilitate either 
type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawful under 
the rule of reason. This type of agreement may also be useful 
evidence for a plaintiff attempting to prove the existence of 
a horizontal cartel.504
In other words, the horizontal relationship, if naked, might be 
unlawful per se. However, the participation by a vertically related 
collaborator would have to be addressed under the rule of reason. The 
Court’s rationale is perplexing—if the cartel is naked, wouldn’t the 
vertically related firm’s participation be naked as well? One might say 
that the RPM in question actually served the manufacturer’s interest by 
controlling free riding. But in that case, the RPM in question would be an 
output increasing strategy and the dealers’ arrangement should be 
addressed under the rule of reason as well. The Court might have been 
suggesting leniency for a vertically related firm that participated in the 
cartel against its will, but the rule of reason is the wrong vehicle for doing 
so.
In its United States v. Apple, Inc.505 decision, the Second Circuit added 
a sensible qualification: if the vertically related firm is the one who 
actually initiates or facilitates the cartel, the per se rule applies to its own 
conduct as well.506 A dissenter complained that the majority’s approach 
was inconsistent with the above-quoted language from Leegin, requiring 
rule of reason evaluation for the conduct of the vertically related firm.507
The Leegin dicta aside, Apple’s participation in (and solicitation of) 
the restraint was naked,508 making it difficult to see what could be 
accomplished by requiring the rule of reason. Apple wished to launch an 
e-book store simultaneously with the release of its iPad electronic 
device.509 Amazon, a rival e-book seller, was charging prices that Apple 
believed were too low to make its own entry profitable.510 As a result, it
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solicited an agreement from the major publishers under which they would 
adopt a new model calling for higher prices to be set by each publisher 
and imposed on Amazon.511
We can call this rule of reason if we want, but the fact remains that 
the power was clearly there, as demonstrated by the fact that Amazon 
acceded to the wishes of the publisher cartel.512 The resulting price 
umbrella made Apple’s entry profitable, and it was the only reason 
offered for the horizontal agreement.513 To be sure, some of Amazon’s 
prices may have been below its acquisition costs.514 That fact might 
justify Apple in bringing a predatory-pricing action against Amazon in 
court, but hardly in orchestrating a cartel of book sellers with the power 
to force Amazon to raise its prices. The dissent also complained that 
Apple was, in fact, removing a barrier to entry into the market against 
Amazon, the dominant firm.515 Low prices are always a “barrier to entry” 
against someone who cannot afford to meet them, but once again, the 
removal of this barrier does not justify collusion.
CONCLUSION
The complexities of antitrust’s rule of reason have provoked 
complaints that its use inevitably produces arbitrary results inconsistent 
with due process norms.516 Justice Brandeis’s extraordinarily broad and 
indeterminate formulation in the Chicago Board case posed such a 
threat.517 Evaluation of the legality of restraints under a general welfare
test is also so difficult and indeterminate that it can threaten rational 
adjudication.518
While rule of reason antitrust cases will always be complex, we can 
limit arbitrariness by focusing on price and output effects rather than 
general welfare effects. The triumph of the consumer welfare principle in 
antitrust has served to limit the query to consumer harm rather than 
                                                                                                                     
511. Id. at 303–04.
512. Id. at 308–09.
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514. See id. at 299. Although, the prices were described by the majority as “loss leaders,” 
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attempting to measure the much more difficult tradeoffs involved in 
assessing welfare generally. While the Supreme Court’s Twombly
decision on pleading requirements went further than it needed to,519 it has 
performed the useful function of getting plaintiffs to focus on the correct 
issues when they bring antitrust complaints. They need to allege an 
output-reducing or price-increasing restraint and enough factual 
allegation to make out a plausible claim.520 Ideally, both Twombly’s
approach to antitrust complaints and Matsushita’s approach to summary 
judgment should make antitrust under the rule of reason more rational by 
focusing on those factors that make output reducing restraints more likely 
in the context at hand. An additional way to reduce arbitrary decision-
making is to apply the per se rule to a mode of analysis rather than to a 
classification of restraints. Properly used, this method would limit the 
problem of irrational per se rules.521
Finally, through proper management of presumptions and burden 
shifting, the courts have proven quite capable of assessing restraints 
without the need to “balance” positive and negative effects—an activity 
that almost always forces them out of their area of competence.
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